TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

The Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis was Edmund Husserl's phenomenological investigation into the origin of truth. We find here an early indication of an historical reflection and the identification of a "crisis," the description of primordial dimensions of experience, the genealogy of judgment, and the employment of a new, genetic phenomenological method. While a large portion of the material comprised under this heading is a translation of Husserliana XI, Analysen zur passiven Synthesis, it also includes essential additions to the main text of Husserl's lecture, some supplements, and a partial reorganization of the material.

The "Translator's Introduction" is offered as an orientation to this work. This Introduction is divided into four sections. Section 1 situates the work historically and conceptually, discusses its composition and revised title, and provides a basic overview of material making up this lecture. Section 2 situates the Analyses in the context of a genetic phenomenology, since it is this methodological approach that enables the description of phenomena treated in the Analyses. Section 3 elaborates upon the novel and significant themes in these lectures, such as passivity, affective allure, association, motivation, the unconscious, etc. Section 4 includes final editorial notes on the translation and my acknowledgements. Rather than reserving a special section to explain the translation of various key terms, I integrate this clarification into the course of the explications of sections 2 and 3, and on occasion, discuss them in footnotes appended to the translated text.

1. The Historical and Conceptual Context

Presented here as Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic is one of Edmund Husserl's most renowned series of lectures presented in the 1920s.
Offered three times, Winter Semester 1920/21, Summer Semester 1923, and Winter Semester 1925/26, Husserl's lectures are virtually contemporaneous with writings devoted to the problem of “intersubjectivity” and “individuation” (1921–1927) his reflections on the reduction from *Erste Philosophie* (1923/24), and his considerations of cultural crises and its potential for renewal in the *Kaizo* articles (1922–24). As such, the *Analyses* occupy both an historical and a conceptual “middle point” of his work.

Historically speaking, the *Analyses* are situated between major, well-known published works. On the one hand, they arise twenty years after Husserl's ground-breaking *Logical Investigations* (1900/01), a decade and a half after his first lectures on time-consciousness (1905), and nearly ten years following his *Ideas* (1913); on the other, they precede by several years his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and his *Cartesian Meditations* (both from 1929), and they anticipate his *Crisis* (1934–37) by more than a decade.

While the major insights, novel notions, as well as the import and contribution of these lectures will be explained below, it is possible to say provisionally that these lectures also occupy a center point conceptually. As expressive, even exemplary of his genetic method, they succeed Husserl's earlier phenomenology of consciousness by surpassing both the Cartesian static analysis peculiar to the *Ideas* and the formalism of his early time-consciousness lectures, and they anticipate his generative investigations into intersubjectivity, history, and the lifeworld by initiating a regressive style of inquiry into origins that becomes the hallmark of Husserl's later undertakings in the *Crisis*.

Husserl's fame was well established by the time of these lectures. According to the *Quästurakten* or the "registrar's list" at Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg where Husserl held these lectures, Husserl had 176 persons in attendance the first time he gave them under the title of "Logik" in 1920/21, 133 enrolled in 1923 (now entitled "Ausgewählte phänomenologische Probleme" ["Selected Phenomenological Problems"]), and the numbers tallied 65 in 1925/26 in lectures newly entitled "Grundprobleme
der Logik” [“Fundamental Problems of Logic”].\(^1\) A survey of
these registrar’s lists reveal a number of names familiar to those
acquainted with the phenomenological tradition: Alfred Adler,
Oskar Becker, Franz-Josef Brecht, Käthe Hamburger, Max
Horkheimer, Fritz Kaufmann, Paul Landsberg, Walther Marseille,
Arnold Metzger, Fritz Neumann, Hans Reiner, Wilhelm Szilassi
(1920/21); Marvin Farber, Karl Hanser, Ludwig Landgrebe,
Hasime Tanabe (1923), and Eugen Fink, (again, Ludwig
Landgrebe), Walter Sachs (1925/26).

1. Passive Synthesis and Transcendental Logic

In recent years, these lectures have achieved a near legendary
status under the shorthand rubric of “passive synthesis.” How does
a lecture series preoccupied with the general problem of logic win
its world-wide renown as the “passive synthesis” lectures? There
are at least two reasons for this, one editorial (a), one philosop-
ical (b). After discussing these reasons, I explain the composition
of this English edition and the reasons for its revised title.

A. One reason these lectures have come to be known as the
“passive synthesis” lectures—a reason almost too obvious to
mention—is due to the title assigned to them by the editor of
Husserliana XI, Margot Fleischer, namely, Analysen zur passiven
Synthesis (1966) [Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis]. Why
this title? The original titles Husserl gave to the lectures—
“Logic,” “Selected Phenomenological Problems,” and “Funda-
mental Problems in Logic”—she notes, were simply too broad for
the collection of texts that she assembled in the Husserliana
volume. While the title “Transcendental Logic,” which Husserl
assigned to the lectures on the folders containing the manuscripts,
did give them more specification, this was to her mind still too
imprecise. Instead, she wished to capture the sense attributed to
these investigations by Husserl himself, to wit, Urkonstitutionen
or the analyses of primordial modes of constitution. And while she

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\(^1\) I am grateful to the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg’s Universitätsarchiv for
providing me with the Quästurakten of these three semesters in question. I would also
like to thank Sebastian Luft and Matthias Haenel for transcribing the lists from the
Sütterlin handwriting.
could have also chosen the title "Transcendental Aesthetic" to evoke this sense of the investigations—a title suggested by the occurrence of this expression both in the Analyses and in Formal and Transcendental Logic—she thought that in the wake of Kant it would have given the reader a false impression of what was to be expected from this work. For these reasons, Fleischer settled on the expression "passive synthesis" for the title of this collection, uniting the main portion of the lectures she collated and the supplementary material. This expression is not unwarranted, for it occurs at least a half a dozen times throughout the work. It has de facto proved itself to be a title suited to the material selected for publication in Husserliana XI.

B. The title, however, is not the sole reason for these lectures to have acquired their acclaim as the "passive synthesis" work. While the issue of passive synthesis is a fundamental one and does occupy a large portion of Husserl's investigations in Husserliana XI, the context in which the lectures unfold is a broader one. This context, as intimated above, is transcendental logic.

Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic (published in 1929) was conceived as an "Introduction" to phenomenology, and as such joins the Logical Investigations, Ideas I, and is later joined by Cartesian Meditations and the Crisis. In distinction to, e.g., Ideas I, the way into phenomenology takes place via the natural attitude, in particular, as it is functional in the mathematician and logician. While formal logic—understood both as the apophatic science of propositions and deductive relations as well as the formal ontology of individual objects—serves as the starting point of analysis, it cannot be seen as self-sufficient; it requires an investigation into subjective accomplishments that constitute mathematical and logical truths; it requires a "transcendental logic." But even this, writes Husserl, demands a deeper founding. For as a "critique" of the limits and capacities of logical reasoning, a transcendental logic must understand how a streaming egoic life of consciousness can be constituted as a true being, and it must do this by appealing to a theory of experience and actuality that
founds active cognition and its ideal objects (pp. 112, 259–60, 386).²

Thus, when considering the function of the Analyses in this broader context, we are witness to a peculiar, but almost typical phenomenological movement, a "zig-zag," if you will. Even though Husserl understood his Formal and Transcendental Logic as another "introduction" to phenomenology, and even though this work followed his lectures making up the Analyses, Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic itself can be read as an introduction to the project of the Analyses. Let me explain.

Husserl's actual "Introduction" to these lectures given in 1920/21 (included here in the English edition as "Main Text, Part 1," but published only as an appendix to Husserliana XVII, Formale und Transcendentale Logik) begins with a preliminary consideration of the term "logic." Tracing the term "logic" back to its Platonic founding and to its Greek roots in "logos," and then to the more original "λέγω" as "gathering together," and "expounding upon," Husserl detects in logic a vocation of the critical justification of reason, and as such, a vocation to be the science of all sciences (pp. 1, 8, 387). As a radical and universal a priori theory of science, logic is not to be understood merely as an axiomatic and formalistic deductive system, formed by abstracting general traits from existing or past sciences; for intrinsic to all factual sciences at our disposal is an animating teleological orientation. Even if we never encounter this teleological idea as such, it nonetheless functions guidingly and efficaciously—even if implicitly—when we practice science or operate from theoretical interest. If we find today that the sciences treat their objects of study in a detached, particularized, and fragmented manner, this would only be an expression of the way in which the particular sciences themselves become detached from "the aim, sense, and possibility of genuine science." They have lost the sense of their own orientation that ultimately gives them meaning and to which they refer back as indexes.

² All references to the Analyses in the "Translator's Introduction" will be given to this English edition.
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