This collection originated at a conference organized by the department of the philosophy of language and philosophy of science of the Philosophical Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences held in Karlovy Vary in August 1995. Most of the papers in this volume were presented on that occasion. Professor Quine presented the paper included here and also commented on those given at that time. The questions for Professor Quine put forward in the present volume are arranged into three sections. They bear on issues in the theory of knowledge, the philosophy of language and the philosophy of logic.

To a some extent the organization parallels the treatment Quine himself gives to his views in some recent works. Quine's naturalizing of questions of epistemology involves a naturalistic account of the language employed in recording our knowledge claims and this in turn leads to questions about language and meaning, and logic and reference. The initial essays on naturalized epistemology deal with questions concerning the role of observational factors, which Quine addresses in his paper on Triangulation and which Szubka and George then take up. Grayling and Lehrer question the very project of naturalizing epistemology. Gibson considers Quine's relationship to Wittgenstein, Bergstrom an empiricist definition of truth, Miscevic the status of the a priori and Gjelsvik offers a naturalistic account of decision making.

The section on the philosophy of language concentrates on Quine's well known conjecture of the indeterminacy of translation. Segal, Antony, Horwich, Pagin and Stoutland examine the conjecture from varying vantage points: Segal suggests that a mentalistic semantics can mitigate against the indeterminacy and Antony that data concerning language acquisition argue that same result, Horwich focuses on whether translation provides the way to approach meaning, Pagin on the public nature of our knowledge of meanings, and Stoutland on the normative nature of rules of language.

The last part on logic and reference begins with an examination of the problem concerning vacuous names which Quine dubbed Plato's beard. Parsons and Woodruff then take up matters concerning vagueness. Neale, Ray, and Recanati raise questions concerning issues surrounding opacity: Neale and Ray on modality and Recanati on propositional attitudes.

We, and most particularly I, Alex Orenstein, would like to express indebtedness to Queens College of the City University of New York for a presidential research award which provided time to work on this project, to the Faculty Research Award Program of the City University of New York for a grant which aided us in preparing the manuscript for publication, to Wolfson, to St. Anne's and to Exeter Colleges, Oxford for the use of their facilities during much of the preparation of this work and to Roger Gibson and Douglas Quine for their help with the proofs. Last of all, we would like to record our gratitude to Marx Wartofsky, whose untimely death prevented our thanking him in person. His help made it possible for this collection to appear in the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science series.

Alex Orenstein and Peter Kotatko
Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine
Orenstein, A.; Kotatko, P. (Eds.)
2000, XI, 446 p., Hardcover