Authors:
- Provides a comprehensive coverage of subgame consistent cooperation
- Presents solution techniques for complex subgame consistent cooperation
- Equips readers to design sustainable collaboration plans
- Illustrates applications in business, environmental study and public goods provision
- Enriches the study of cooperative dynamic games
Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library C (TDLC, volume 47)
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Table of contents (15 chapters)
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Front Matter
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Continuous-Time Analysis
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Front Matter
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Discrete-Time Analysis
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Front Matter
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Back Matter
About this book
Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of subgame consistency in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this “classic” problem in game theory.
This book is a comprehensive treatise on subgame consistent dynamic cooperation covering the up-to-date state of the art analyses in this important topic. It sets out to provide the theory, solution techniques and applications of subgame consistent cooperation in a wide spectrum of paradigms for analysis which includes cooperative dynamic game models with stochastic state dynamics, with uncertain future payoffs, with asynchronous players’ horizons, with random cooperation duration, with control spaces switching and with transferable and nontransferable payoffs. The book would be a significant research reference text for researchers in game theory, economists, applied mathematicians, policy-makers, corporate decision-makers, and graduate students in applied mathematics, game theory, decision sciences, economics and management sciences.
Reviews
Authors and Affiliations
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SRS Consortium for Advanced Study, Hong Kong Shue Yan University SRS Consortium for Advanced Study, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
David W.K. Yeung
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app.20, Saint-Petersburg State University app.20, St.Petersburg, Russia
Leon A. Petrosyan
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Subgame Consistent Cooperation
Book Subtitle: A Comprehensive Treatise
Authors: David W.K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan
Series Title: Theory and Decision Library C
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1545-8
Publisher: Springer Singapore
eBook Packages: Mathematics and Statistics, Mathematics and Statistics (R0)
Copyright Information: Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016
Hardcover ISBN: 978-981-10-1544-1Published: 05 October 2016
Softcover ISBN: 978-981-10-9382-1Published: 15 June 2018
eBook ISBN: 978-981-10-1545-8Published: 23 September 2016
Series ISSN: 0924-6126
Series E-ISSN: 2194-3044
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XIV, 520
Number of Illustrations: 23 b/w illustrations
Topics: Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences, Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods