Individuals, Essence and Identity

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xv

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2. Ontology and Analysis

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

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   2. The Question of Realism

      • Kit Fine

      Pages 3-48

   3. Words and Objects

      • Achille C. Varzi

      Pages 49-75

3. Essence and Existence

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 77-77

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   2. Being and Essence in Contemporary Interpretations of Aristotle

      • Enrico Berti

      Pages 79-107

   3. Some Comments on Prof. Enrico Berti’s “Being and Essence in Contemporary Interpretations of Aristotle”

      • David Charles

      Pages 109-126

   4. Existence, Identity and an Aristotelian Tradition

      • Alex Orenstein

      Pages 127-149

   5. Orenstein on Existence and Identity

      • Mauro Mariani

      Pages 151-161

   6. Abstract Objects: A Case Study

      • Stephen Yablo

      Pages 163-188

   7. Kinds, Essence, and Natural Necessity

      • E. Jonathan Lowe

      Pages 189-206

   8. Kinds of Necessity: A Commentary on E.J. Lowe’s Paper “Kinds, Essence, and Natural Necessity”

      • Käthe Trettin

      Pages 207-213

4. Identity

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 215-215

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   2. On the Notion of Identity in Aristotle

      • Mario Mignucci

      Pages 217-238

   3. Sameness in Aristotle’s Topics

      • Paolo Crivelli

      Pages 239-245

   4. Identity and Supervenience

      • David Wiggins

      Pages 247-265

   5. Comments on Wiggins’s “Identity and Supervenience”

      • Edmund Runggaldier

      Pages 267-271

   6. Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz’s Law

      • Timothy Williamson

      Pages 273-303

   7. Williamson on Vagueness, Identity and Leibniz’s Law

      • Dorothy Edgington

      Pages 305-318

   8. Origins and Identities

      • Graeme Forbes

      Pages 319-340

Andrea Bottani Massimiliano Carrara Pierdaniele Giaretta What do we do when we do metaphysics? The aim of this introduction is to give a provisional answer to this question, and then to explain the subtitle of the volume. It is easy to observe that when we do meta­ physics we engage in a linguistic activity, mainly consisting of uttering declarative sentences that are not very clear to most people. That is true, but, of course, it is not very informative. What do we speak of when we do metaphysics? A traditional answer could be: we speak of what things really are, so suggesting that things can appear in a way that is different from the way they really are. So understood, meta­ physics is about the sense, or the senses, of "real being". A question that immediately arises is whether the sense of being is unique or is different for different types of things. Another question is whether it is possible that something could appear to be, but really not be. Modem analytic metaphysicians usually answer that the sense of being is unique, while acknowledging that there are different kinds of things, and that to say that something could appear to be but really not be is a plain contradiction, unless what is understood is that it could appear to us that there is something having such and such features, but viii Individuals, Essence, and Identity really there is no such a thing.

• Aristotle
• metaphysics
• ontology

• Università di Bergamo, Italy

  Andrea Bottani

• Università di Padova, Italy

  Massimiliano Carrara, Pierdaniele Giaretta

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