Overview
- Investigates the phenomenon of overbalancing through an analysis of Japan's foreign policy during the 1920s/30s
- Addresses flaws in the literature on Japan’s interwar behavior and contributes to Global International Relations
- Combines Neoclassical realism and literature on civil-military relations to explain Japan’s rush to the Pacific War
Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in International Relations (PSIR)
Access this book
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Other ways to access
Table of contents (6 chapters)
-
Front Matter
-
Back Matter
Keywords
About this book
This book investigates the phenomenon of overbalancing through an analysis of Japan’s foreign policy during the interbellum. In the mid-1930s, Japan withdrew from a naval arms control framework that had restrained military buildup on both sides of the Pacific Ocean since the early 1920s. By doing so, Japan not only triggered a naval arms race with the United States that exhausted its economy, it also destroyed the last institutionalized structure regulating the relationship between the two Pacific powers. Japan and the United States became caught in a spiral of tensions that culminated with the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Puzzling is the fact that the international environment in the Asia-Pacific was relatively stable in the mid-1930s, while Washington was pursuing a policy of accommodation toward Tokyo. By rejecting arms control and engaging in unfettered naval expansion, Japan overbalanced against the United States and began its rush to the Pacific War.
The book explains Japan’s overbalancing with a neoclassical realist model that combines the literatures on threat perception and civil-military relations. Amid the Manchurian crisis of 1931-1933, as the Japanese government collaborated with the military institution to address the situation in China, military influence on the formulation of foreign policy surged. The perceptual and policy biases of the military, which include the tendency to distrust other countries’ intentions, to adopt worst-case analyses of international dynamics and to strive to maximize military power, gradually penetrated the decision-making process. Dysfunctions in the preexisting structure of Japanese civil-military relations, engendered by an over-depoliticization of the military institution, allowed the navy to convince policymakers that the United States was inherently hostile to Japan, hence the necessity to prepare for war. The government was brainstormed, adopting the biased military perspective on international affairs. Japan overbalanced in a myopic but conscious way.Authors and Affiliations
About the author
Lionel P. Fatton is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Webster University Geneva, Switzerland, and Research Collaborator at the Research Institute for the History of Global Arms Transfer, Meiji University, Japan.
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War
Book Subtitle: The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing
Authors: Lionel P. Fatton
Series Title: Palgrave Studies in International Relations
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22053-1
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan Cham
eBook Packages: Political Science and International Studies, Political Science and International Studies (R0)
Copyright Information: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-031-22052-4Published: 01 March 2023
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-031-22055-5Published: 02 March 2024
eBook ISBN: 978-3-031-22053-1Published: 28 February 2023
Series ISSN: 2946-2673
Series E-ISSN: 2946-2681
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XXIII, 313
Number of Illustrations: 1 b/w illustrations, 4 illustrations in colour
Topics: International Relations Theory, International Security Studies