Overview
- Presents political economy explanations of States’ international engagement
- Scrutinizes the effects of domestic-level institutional features on politicians’ incentives
- Performs empirical tests drawing on data covering a worldwide sample of democratic countries
Part of the book series: International Law and Economics (ILEC)
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Table of contents (5 chapters)
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Front Matter
Keywords
- International treaties
- International organizations
- Design of international organizations
- Panel data
- Credible commitment
- Time inconsistency
- Time horizon
- Hands tying
- Commitment device
- Public goods
- Electoral system
- Legal origin
- Proportional representation
- Pork barrel politics
- Separation of power
- Judicial independence
- Programmatic parties
- Vote trading
- Principal agent theory
About this book
This volume analyzes international agreements from a political economy perspective. In four essays, it raises the question of whether domestic institutions help explain if countries join international agreements, and in case they do, what type of international organization they join.
The book examines how specific democratic design elements channel and mediate domestic demands directed at politicians, and how under certain circumstances entering international agreements helps politicians navigate these demands to their benefit. The volume also distinguishes between different types of international instruments with a varying expected constraining effect upon member states, and empirically tests if this matters for incentives to join.
The volume addresses scholars, students, and practitioners interested in a better understanding of how the shape of domestic institutions affects politicians’ incentives to enter into binding international agreements.
Editors and Affiliations
About the editor
Florian Kiesow Cortez is a researcher and lecturer in political economy. His research focuses on comparative political economy, global governance, global public goods, the design of international organizations, and the empirical analysis of constitutions. He has published work empirically assessing determinants of international treaty ratification. He is also interested in the political economy of under-development.
He obtained his doctorate from the University of Hamburg, Germany, where he was a member of a graduate school organized by the Institute of Law and Economics and funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). He was formerly a research fellow at George Mason University, Arlington, USA, and a visiting research fellow at Columbia University, New York, USA, and at the University of California, Berkeley, USA.
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: The Political Economy of International Agreements
Book Subtitle: A Collection of Essays
Editors: Florian Kiesow Cortez
Series Title: International Law and Economics
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85194-1
Publisher: Springer Cham
eBook Packages: Economics and Finance, Economics and Finance (R0)
Copyright Information: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-030-85193-4Published: 27 September 2021
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-030-85196-5Published: 28 September 2022
eBook ISBN: 978-3-030-85194-1Published: 25 September 2021
Series ISSN: 2364-1851
Series E-ISSN: 2364-186X
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: VII, 122
Number of Illustrations: 1 b/w illustrations
Topics: Law and Economics, Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy, Electoral Politics, International Economics, International Organization