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Palgrave Macmillan

Presidents, Unified Government and Legislative Control

  • Book
  • © 2021

Overview

  • Presents a unique contribution to our understanding on why some presidents are more successful in winning legislators' support than others.
  • Explains how institutional factors such as confidence vote, electoral system, candidate nomination and presidential unilateral power influence the ability of presidents to pass their legislative agendas through comparisons across presidential and semi-presidential systems.
  • Covers five presidential and semi-presidential systems such as France, Indonesia, Mexico, Taiwan, and U.S. with a wide variety of institutional arrangements and political dynamics

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics (PASTPRPO)

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Table of contents (8 chapters)

Keywords

About this book

This book aims to explain why some presidents are more successful than others in winning the support of legislators during periods of unified government. This book covers five presidential and semi-presidential systems such as France, Indonesia, Mexico, Taiwan, and the U.S. with a wide variety of institutional arrangements and political dynamics. This book elaborates on explaining how institutional factors such as confidence vote, electoral system, candidate nomination and presidential unilateral power influence the ability of presidents to pass their legislative agendas through comparisons across presidential and semi-presidential systems.

Reviews

“This book provides an innovative and relevant cross-country analysis of inter-branch coordination in unified governments, exploring institutional and partisan drivers of legislative cohesion of the government. It challenges the view that unified government raises the legislative success rates of chief executives, and focuses on factors affecting party unity in this context. Joseph Tsai and his contributors develop a framework for analyzing legislative cohesion based on four main institutional factors: confidence vote, electoral system, candidate nomination, and presidential unilateral power. The book offers a clear and interesting approach to interbranch coordination under different institutional conditions. In this way, the theoretical framework opens new avenues for understanding variation in the executive’s success in approving legislation introduced or sponsored by chief executives. In addition, this book can move this scholarship forward by enlarging the empirical comparison of unified government and inter-branch coordination across presidential and semi-presidential systems.”

Magna Inácio, Associate Professor at Universidade Federal, De Minas Gerais, Brazil


Editors and Affiliations

  • Dept of Politics, National Chung Cheng University, Chia-yi, Taiwan

    Jung-Hsiang Tsai

About the editor

Jung-Hsiang Tsai is Professor of Political Science at the National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan. He earned his PhD in Political Science from Boston University, USA. His research interests include comparative semi-presidential studies, comparative presidential studies, Sino-US relationships, and qualitative political methods. His works have been published in Crime, Law, and Social Change, French Politics, and Democratization.


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