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Unity, Truth and the Liar

The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox

  • Book
  • © 2008

Overview

Editors:
  1. Shahid Rahman
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  2. Tero Tulenheimo

    1. Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

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  3. Emmanuel Genot
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  • Provides a formal reconstruction of several medieval theories of truth, demonstrating their relevance to modern research
  • Approaches the discussion about truth theory and paradoxes from a semantical, logical and a historical perspective
  • Contains critical editions of the medieval sources of the insolubilia, such as Heytesbury’s treatise on Insolubles (14th century), with introduction and notes
  • Revives the debate on the Liar Paradox
  • Entirely written in dispute style

Part of the book series: Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science (LEUS, volume 8)

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Table of contents (15 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xxiv
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  2. Disputatio

    1. The Truth Schema and the Liar

      • Stephen Read
      Pages 3-17

    2. Read and Indirect Revenge

      • Bradley Armour-Garb
      Pages 19-40

    3. Tarski's Hidden Theory of Meaning: Sentences Say Exactly One Thing

      • Catarina Dutilh Novaes*
      Pages 41-63

    4. Doubting Thomas: From Bradwardine Back to Anon

      • Laurence Goldstein
      Pages 65-85

    5. Logic Without Truth

      • Gyula Klima
      Pages 87-112

    6. Scheming and Lying

      • Eugene Mills
      Pages 113-128

    7. Comments on Stephen Read's “The Truth-Schema and the Liar”

      • Terence Parsons
      Pages 129-134

    8. Models for Liars in Bradwardine's Theory of Truth

      • Greg Restall*
      Pages 135-147

    9. On a New Account of the Liar

      • José M. Sagüillo*
      Pages 149-157

    10. The Liar Cannot Be Solved

      • György Serény
      Pages 159-186

    11. Out of the Liar Tangle

      • B. Hartley Slater
      Pages 187-197

    12. Read about T-Scheme

      • Jan Woleński
      Pages 199-203

    13. Further Thoughts on Tarski's T-scheme and the Liar

      • Stephen Read
      Pages 205-225

  4. Back Matter

    Pages 335-338
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Keywords

About this book

Andinmy haste, I said: “Allmenare Liars” 1 —Psalms 116:11 The Original Lie Philosophical analysis often reveals and seldom solves paradoxes. To quote Stephen Read: A paradox arises when an unacceptable conclusion is supported by a plausible argument from apparently acceptable premises. [...] So three di?erent reactions to the paradoxes are possible: to show that the r- soning is fallacious; or that the premises are not true after all; or that 2 the conclusion can in fact be accepted. There are sometimes elaborate ways to endorse a paradoxical conc- sion. One might be prepared to concede that indeed there are a number of grains that make a heap, but no possibility to know this number. However, some paradoxes are more threatening than others; showing the conclusiontobeacceptableisnotaseriousoption,iftheacceptanceleads to triviality. Among semantic paradoxes, the Liar (in any of its versions) 3 o?ers as its conclusion a bullet no one would be willing to bite. One of the most famous versions of the Liar Paradox was proposed by Epimenides, though its attribution to the Cretan poet and philosopher has only a relatively recent history. It seems indeed that Epimenides was mentioned neither in ancient nor in medieval treatments of the Liar 1 Jewish Publication Society translation. 2 Read [1].

Editors and Affiliations

  • Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

    Tero Tulenheimo

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