Design and Reform of Taxation Policy

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-x

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2. Tax Design and Reform: Theoretical Issues

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

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   2. The Theory of Commodity Tax Reform: A Survey

      • Fabrizio Bulckaen

      Pages 3-37

   3. The Fiscal System and the Dynamic Redistribution of Income

      • Valentino Dardanoni

      Pages 39-54

   4. The Effects of Uncertain Tax Policies on the Behaviour of Firms

      • Riccardo Martina

      Pages 55-68

   5. Demographic Changes, Public Saving and Tax Policies

      • Beniamino Quintieri, Furio Camillo Rosati

      Pages 69-91

3. Non Marginal Tax Reforms

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 93-93

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   2. From Personal to Indirect Taxation: A General Equilibrium Approach

      • Amedeo Fossati, Barbara Cavalletti, Alberto Pench

      Pages 95-112

   3. Fiscal System and Fiscal Reform in Italy in the 90s

      • Vincenzo Visco

      Pages 113-151

   4. Welfare Effects of Tax Progressivity

      • Francesca Stroffolini

      Pages 153-177

   5. Fiscal Autonomy, Grants-in-Aid and Expenditure of Local Governments

      • Rosella Levaggi

      Pages 179-207

4. Erratum

   1. Erratum to: Fiscal System and Fiscal Reform in Italy in the 90s

      • G. Galeotti, M. Marrelli

      Pages 211-211

5. Back Matter

   Pages 209-210

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G. Galeotti* and M. Marrelli** *Universita di Perugia **Universita di Napoli 1. The economic analysis of optimal taxation has permitted considerable steps to be taken towards the understanding of a number of problems: the appropriate degree of progression, the balance between different taxes, the equity-efficiency trade-off etc .. Though at times considered as abstract and of little use in policy design, the issues it addresses are real ones and very much on the agenda of many countries. As usual in scientific debate, criticisms have contributed to the correct understanding of the theoretical problems involved and made clear that, at the present state of the art, definitive conclusions may be premature. A first well-taken criticism addresses the assumption, underlying optimal taxation models, of a competitive economy with perfect information on the part of individual agents and full market clearing. Once we leave the Arrow-Debreu world, it is no longer necessarily the case that taxes and transfers introduce distortions on otherwise efficient allocations.

• demography
• tax reform
• taxation
• welfare

• Università di Perugia, Italy

  G. Galeotti

• Università di Napoli, Italy

  M. Marrelli

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