Transcendental Arguments and Science

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-viii

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2. The Structure and Function of Transcendental Arguments

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

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   2. Transcendental Proofs in the Critique of Pure Reason

      • Manfred Baum

      Pages 3-26

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   3. Transcendental Arguments, Synthetic and Analytic

      • Rüdiger Bittner

      Pages 27-35

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   4. A Note on Transcendental Propositions in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

      • Konrad Cramer

      Pages 37-43

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   5. Analytic Transcendental Arguments

      • Jonathan Bennett

      Pages 45-64

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   6. On Bennett’s ‘Analytic Transcendental Arguments’

      • Stephan Körner

      Pages 65-69

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   7. Comment on Bennett

      • Günther Patzig

      Pages 71-75

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   8. Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference, and Pragmatism

      • Richard Rorty

      Pages 77-103

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   9. Comment on Rorty

      • Wolfgang Carl

      Pages 105-112

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   10. Challenger or Competitor?

       • Dieter Henrich

       Pages 113-120

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3. The Conceptual Foundations of Science

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 121-121

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   2. The Preconditions of Experience and the Unity of Physics

      • C. F. Von Weizsäcker

      Pages 123-158

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   3. Comment on Von Weizsäcker

      • Mary Hesse

      Pages 159-170

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   4. Comment on Von Weizsäcker

      • Peter Mittelstaedt

      Pages 171-176

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   5. The Concept of Science. Some Remarks on the Methodological Issue ‘Construction’ Versus ‘Description’ in the Philosophy of Science

      • Kuno Lorenz

      Pages 177-190

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   6. Transcendentalism and Protoscience

      • Rüdiger Bubner

      Pages 191-195

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   7. Sellarsian Realism and Conceptual Change in Science

      • Richard M. Burian

      Pages 197-225

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   8. Some Remarks on Realism and Scientific Revolutions

      • Lorenz Krüger

      Pages 227-233

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   9. Realism and Underdetermination

      • Charles Parsons

      Pages 235-242

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The goal of the present volume is to discuss the notion of a 'conceptual framework' or 'conceptual scheme', which has been dominating much work in the analysis and justification of knowledge in recent years. More specifi­ cally, this volume is designed to clarify the contrast between two competing approaches in the area of problems indicated by this notion: On the one hand, we have the conviction, underlying much present-day work in the philosophy of science, that the best we can hope for in the justifi­ cation of empirical knowledge is to reconstruct the conceptual means actually employed by science, and to develop suitable models for analyzing conceptual change involved in the progress of science. This view involves the assumption that we should stop taking foundational questions of epistemology seriously and discard once and for all the quest for uncontrovertible truth. The result­ ing program of justifying epistemic claims by subsequently describing patterns of inferentially connected concepts as they are at work in actual science is closely connected with the idea of naturalizing epistemology, with concep­ tual relativism, and with a pragmatic interpretation of knowledge. On the other hand, recent epistemology tends to claim that no subsequent reconstruction of actually employed conceptual frameworks is sufficient for providing epistemic justification for our beliefs about the world. This second claim tries to resist the naturalistic and pragmatic approach to epistemology and insists on taking the epistemological sceptic seriously.

• Immanuel Kant
• epistemology
• experience
• reason
• scepticism

• Philosophisches Seminar, der Universität Heidelberg, Germany

  Peter Bieri

• Abteilung Philosophie, der Universität Bielefeld, Germany

  Rolf-P. Horstmann, Lorenz Krüger

Policies and ethics