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A Terrible Efficiency

Entrepreneurial Bureaucrats and the Nazi Holocaust

  • Book
  • © 2019

Overview

Authors:
  1. Franklin G. Mixon, Jr.

    1. Center for Economic Education, Columbus State University, Columbus, USA

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  • Explains an important historical event in microeconomics and cliometrics frameworks
  • Blends economics with history, organization theory, and statistical analysis
  • Provides a new insight into Holocaust studies

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Table of contents (7 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xvii
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  2. The Organization of Terror and Murder

    • Franklin G. Mixon Jr.
    Pages 1-15

  3. The Modern Theory of Bureaucracy

    • Franklin G. Mixon Jr.
    Pages 17-35

  4. Bureaucratic Competition in the Third Reich

    • Franklin G. Mixon Jr.
    Pages 37-59

  5. Vertical Trust Networks in the Nazi Bureaucracy

    • Franklin G. Mixon Jr.
    Pages 61-99

  6. Horizontal Trust Networks in the Nazi Bureaucracy

    • Franklin G. Mixon Jr.
    Pages 101-117

  7. Coercion and Vertical Trust in the Nazi Bureaucracy

    • Franklin G. Mixon Jr.
    Pages 119-128

  8. The Last of the Third Reich’s Vertical Trust Networks?

    • Franklin G. Mixon Jr.
    Pages 129-144

  9. Back Matter

    Pages 145-153
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Keywords

About this book

This book provides numerous examples that apply the modern theory of bureaucracy developed in Breton and Wintrobe (1982 and 1986) to the Nazi Holocaust. More specifically, the book argues, as do Breton and Wintrobe (1986), that the subordinates in the Nazi bureaucracy were not “following orders” as they claimed during the war crimes trials at Nuremberg and elsewhere, but were instead exhibiting an entrepreneurial spirit in competing with one another in order to find the most efficient way of exacting the Final Solution. This involved engaging in a process of exchange with their superiors, wherein the subordinates offered the kinds of informal services that are not codified in formal contracts. In doing so, they were competing for the rewards, or informal payments not codified in formal contracts, that were conferred by those at the top of the bureaucracy. These came in the form of rapid promotion, perquisites (pecuniary and in-kind), and other awards. The types of exchanges described above are based on “trust,” not formal institutions.


 


Authors and Affiliations

  • Center for Economic Education, Columbus State University, Columbus, USA

    Franklin G. Mixon, Jr.

About the author

Franklin G. Mixon, Jr., is Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Economic Education at Columbus State University, USA. He earned a PhD in economics from Auburn University in 1992 and began his academic career at Southeastern Louisiana University (1992-1994).  Mixon has also held academic posts at the University of Southern Mississippi (1994-2007), Auburn University (2008-2009) and Mercer University (2009-2010). He is the author of more than 150 journal publications and seven scholarly books.

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