Reform Processes and Policy Change

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-x

   PDF

2. Introduction

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

      PDF

   2. Veto Player Theory and Policy Change: An Introduction

      • George Tsebelis

      Pages 3-18

3. Identification of Veto Players

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 19-19

      PDF

   2. Empirical Applications of Veto Player Analysis and Institutional Effectiveness

      • Mark Hallerberg

      Pages 21-42

   3. The Veto Player Approach in Macro-Comparative Politics: Concepts and Measurement

      • Detlef Jahn

      Pages 43-68

   4. Measuring Policy Positions of Veto Players in Parliamentary Democracies

      • Thomas König, Bernd Luig, Sven-Oliver Proksch, Jonathan B. Slapin

      Pages 69-95

4. Interpretation of Veto Players

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 97-97

      PDF

   2. Mutual Veto? How Coalitions Work

      • Wolfgang C. Müller, Thomas M. Meyer

      Pages 99-124

   3. Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Stability in 17 European Parliaments, 1945–1999

      • Thomas Saalfeld

      Pages 125-143

   4. The Sources of Bipartisan Politics in Parliamentary Democracies

      • Thomas Bräuninger, Marc Debus

      Pages 145-164

   5. Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?

      • Thomas König, Dirk Junge

      Pages 165-186

5. Modelling of Veto Players

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 187-187

      PDF

   2. Testing the Law-Making Theories in a Parliamentary Democracy: A Roll Call Analysis of the Italian Chamber of Deputies (1988–2008)

      • Luigi Curini, Francesco Zucchini

      Pages 189-211

   3. Domestic Veto Players, Commission Monitoring and the Implementation of European Policy

      • Bernard Steunenberg

      Pages 213-230

   4. Strategic Voting in a Bicameral Setting

      • Simon Hug

      Pages 231-245

   5. Game Theoretic Models and the Empirical Analysis of EU Policy Making: Strategic Interaction, Collective Decisions, and Statistical Inference

      • Dirk Junge

      Pages 247-265

6. Conclusion

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 267-267

      PDF

   2. Veto Players, Reform Processes and Policy Change: Concluding Remarks

      • Thomas König, Marc Debus

      Pages 269-283

George Tsebelis’ veto players approach has become a prominent theory to analyze various research questions in political science. Studies that apply veto player theory deal with the impact of institutions and partisan preferences of legislative activity and policy outcomes. It is used to measure the degree of policy change and, thus, reform capacity in national and international political systems. This volume contains the analysis of leading scholars in the field on these topics and more recent developments regarding theoretical and empirical progress in the area of political reform-making. The contributions come from research areas of political science where veto player theory plays a significant role, including, positive political theory, legislative behavior and legislative decision-making in national and supra-national political systems, policy making and government formation. The contributors to this book add to the current scholarly and public debate on the role of veto players, making it of interest to scholars in political science and policy studies as well as policymakers worldwide.

• Legislative Activity
• Policy-Making
• Reform
• Veto Player

• Department of Political Science, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany

  Thomas König

• Mannheim Center for European Research, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany

  Marc Debus

• Dept. Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA

  George Tsebelis

Policies and ethics