The Metaphysics of Science

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xxiv

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2. Empiricism Vs. Realism – The Perennial Debate In The Philosophy Of Science

   Pages 9-48

3. Fundamental And Refined Principles: The Core Of Modern Science

   Pages 49-72

4. Empirical Laws: The Supervention Of Experience

   Pages 73-94

5. Scientific Theories: Closing The Circle

   Pages 95-108

6. The Principle-Theory-Law Model Of Scientific Explanation

   Pages 109-129

7. The Social Sciences: A Consideration Of Economics

   Pages 130-147

8. Natural Kinds

   Pages 148-169

9. Probability And Confirmation

   Pages 170-182

10. Empiricism Vs. Realism Revisited

    Pages 183-192

11. Modern Science And The Future

    Pages 193-208

12. Back Matter

    Pages 209-333

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The roots of this work lie in my earlier book, Scientific Progress, which first appeared in 1981. One of its topics, the distinction - tween scientific laws and theories, is there treated with reference to the same distinction as drawn by N. R. Campbell in his Physics: The Elements. Shortly after completing Scientific Progress, I read Rom Harré’s The Principles of Scientific Thinking, in which the concept of theory is even more clearly delineated than in Campbell, being directly connected to the notion of a model – as it was in my book. In subsequent considerations regarding science, Harré’s work thus - came my main source of inspiration with regard to theories, while Campbell’s remained my main source with respect to empirical laws. Around the same time I also read William Whewell’s Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. In this work, Whewell depicts principles as playing a central role in the formation of science, and conceives of them in much the same way as Kant conceives of fundamental synthetic a priori judgements. The idea that science should have principles as a basic element immediately made sense to me, and from that time I have thought of science in terms of laws, theories and principles.

• Laws
• Principles
• Theories
• evolution
• experience
• knowledge
• metaphysics
• philosophy of science
• probability
• reduction
• science

From the reviews:

"Dilworth does not content himself with a mere philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of modern science, but tries to draw a lesson from the analysis applicable to the actual practice of science. Whereas in its beginnings modern science was a paradigm of open-mindedness, it is now in danger of becomming an ideology, due to its refusal to reflect on its own principles.  The Metaphysics of Science performs the much-needed function of opening the doors to such reflection - both for professional philosophers and scientists themselves''.(L.E. Fleischhacker, Epistemologia)

From the reviews of the second edition:

"Craig Dilworth’s second edition of The Metaphysics of Science contains the main text of an ambitious philosophical treatment intended to resolve realist-empiricist debates about the nature of science … . This book is worthwhile for philosophers of science and could profitably be assigned as reserve text for upper level undergraduate courses in history and philosophy of science of metaphysics. … Dilworth’s main aim is to propose and defend a metaphysics of science based on three ontological principles, uniformity of nature, substance, and causality." (Robert L. Muhlnickel, Metapsychology Online Reviews, Vol. 12 (22), May, 2008)

"Science makes metaphysical presuppositions. I must … at once declare an interest. … According to Dilworth, the three metaphysical principles constitute ‘the core of modern science’ … . They guide research and provide methodological rules. … Dilworth suggests that we need a new metaphysical paradigm for a new kind of science. … this book propounds an immensely important idea–even if one that received a much improved formulation at least twelve years before publication of the first edition." (Nicholas Maxwell, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, August, 2009)

• Uppsala University

  Craig Dilworth

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