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Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition

  • Book
  • © 2014

Overview

Editors:
  1. Mattia Gallotti

    1. School of Advanced Study, University of London, London, United Kingdom

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  2. John Michael

    1. Central European University, Budapest, Hungary

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  • First collection of contributions combining research on social ontology and social cognition
  • Explores theoretical and empirical literature on the ontology of artefacts that has rapidly expanded across the sciences of mind and brain
  • Contains new commentary by and interview with John Searle in which he addresses the criticisms raised by the other authors
  • Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Part of the book series: Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality (SIPS, volume 4)

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Table of contents (12 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-viii
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  2. Objects in Mind

    • Mattia Gallotti, John Michael
    Pages 1-13

  3. Perspectives on Social Ontology

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 15-15
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    2. Are There Social Objects?

      • John R. Searle
      Pages 17-26

    3. Deflating Socially Constructed Objects: What Thoughts Do to the World

      • Ruth Garrett Millikan
      Pages 27-39

    4. How Many Kinds of Glue Hold the Social World Together?

      • Brian Epstein
      Pages 41-55

    5. On the Nature of Social Kinds

      • Francesco Guala
      Pages 57-68

    6. Normativity of the Background: A Contextualist Account of Social Facts

      • Enrico Terrone, Daniela Tagliafico
      Pages 69-86

    7. Social Ontology and the Objection from Reification

      • Edouard Machery
      Pages 87-100

  4. Perspectives on Social Cognition

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 101-101
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    2. Constraints on Joint Action

      • Cédric Paternotte
      Pages 103-123

    3. How Objects Become Social in the Brain: Five Questions for a Neuroscience of Social Reality

      • Cristina Becchio, Cesare Bertone
      Pages 125-134

    4. Materializing Mind: The Role of Objects in Cognition and Culture

      • Kristian Tylén, John J. McGraw
      Pages 135-148

    5. Perceiving Affordances and Social Cognition

      • Anika Fiebich
      Pages 149-166

    6. Social Cognition as Causal Inference: Implications for Common Knowledge and Autism

      • Jakob Hohwy, Colin Palmer
      Pages 167-189
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Keywords

About this book

Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition brings together contributions discussing issues arising from theoretical and empirical research on social ontology and social cognition. It is the first comprehensive interdisciplinary collection in this rapidly expanding area. The contributors draw upon their diverse backgrounds in philosophy, cognitive science, behavioral economics, sociology of science and anthropology.

Based largely on contributions to the first Aarhus-Paris conference held at the University of Aarhus in June 2012, the book addresses such questions as: If the reference of concepts like money is fixed by collective acceptance, does it depend on mechanisms that are distinct from those which contribute to understanding the reference of concepts of other kinds of entity? What psychological and neural mechanisms, if any, are involved in the constitution, persistence and recognition of social facts?

The editors’ introduction considers strands of research that have gained increasing importance in explaining the cognitive foundations of acts of sociality, for example, the theory that humans are predisposed and motivated to engage in joint action with con-specifics thanks to mechanisms that enable them to share others’ mental states. The book also presents a commentary written by John Searle for this volume and an interview in which the editors invite Searle to respond to the various questions raised in the introduction and by the other contributors.

Editors and Affiliations

  • School of Advanced Study, University of London, London, United Kingdom

    Mattia Gallotti

  • Central European University, Budapest, Hungary

    John Michael

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