Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes

A Defense of Internal Realism

  • Book
  • © 2001

Overview

Authors:
  1. Gábor Forrai

    1. University of Miskolc, Hungary

    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Part of the book series: Synthese Library (SYLI, volume 296)

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this book

Log in via an institution
eBook USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access

Licence this eBook for your library

Institutional subscriptions

Table of contents (5 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-vii
    Download chapter PDF

  2. Introduction

    • Gábor Forrai
    Pages 1-9

  3. Metaphysical Realism and Internal Realism

    • Gábor Forrai
    Pages 10-39

  4. Reference

    • Gábor Forrai
    Pages 40-72

  5. Truth

    • Gábor Forrai
    Pages 73-109

  6. Conceptual Pluralism

    • Gábor Forrai
    Pages 110-132

  7. Back Matter

    Pages 133-163
    Download chapter PDF
Back to top

Keywords

About this book

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The purpose of the book is to develop internal realism, the metaphysical-episte­ mological doctrine initiated by Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History, "Introduction", Many Faces). In doing so I shall rely - sometimes quite heavily - on the notion of conceptual scheme. I shall use the notion in a somewhat idiosyncratic way, which, however, has some affinities with the ways the notion has been used during its history. So I shall start by sketching the history of the notion. This will provide some background, and it will also give opportunity to raise some of the most important problems I will have to solve in the later chapters. The story starts with Kant. Kant thought that the world as we know it, the world of tables, chairs and hippopotami, is constituted in part by the human mind. His cen­ tral argument relied on an analysis of space and time, and presupposed his famous doctrine that knowledge cannot extend beyond all possible experience. It is a central property of experience - he claimed - that it is structured spatially and temporally. However, for various reasons, space and time cannot be features of the world, as it is independently of our experience. So he concluded that they must be the forms of human sensibility, i. e. necessary ingredients of the way things appear to our senses.

Authors and Affiliations

  • University of Miskolc, Hungary

    Gábor Forrai

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes

  • Book Subtitle: A Defense of Internal Realism

  • Authors: Gábor Forrai

  • Series Title: Synthese Library

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2868-3

  • Publisher: Springer Dordrecht

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2001

  • Hardcover ISBN: 978-0-7923-6885-4Published: 31 May 2001

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-90-481-5677-1Published: 08 December 2010

  • eBook ISBN: 978-94-017-2868-3Published: 14 March 2013

  • Series ISSN: 0166-6991

  • Series E-ISSN: 2542-8292

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: VII, 163

  • Topics: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Mind

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Back to top

Search

Navigation