Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-viii

   PDF

2. Intentionality and Consciousness

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-7

      PDF

   2. State Consciousness Revisited

      • Pierre Jacob

      Pages 9-32

   3. Conscious Intentionality

      • William Seager

      Pages 33-49

   4. Intentionality, Consciousness and the System’s Perspective

      • Joëlle Proust

      Pages 51-72

   5. Consciousness as Valued Procedural Mode of Apprehension

      • Pierre Livet

      Pages 73-90

3. Qualia and Perception

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 91-94

      PDF

   2. The Colors and Shapes of Visual Experiences

      • David M. Rosenthal

      Pages 95-118

   3. Qualia and Representations

      • Elisabeth Pacherie

      Pages 119-144

   4. Filling-In : Visual Science and the Philosophy of Perception

      • Evan Thompson

      Pages 145-161

   5. Perception, Particulars and Predicates

      • Kevin Mulligan

      Pages 163-194

4. Content Ascription

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 195-198

      PDF

   2. Pretense in Prediction: Simulation and Understanding Minds

      • Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich

      Pages 199-216

   3. Pragmatic Aspects of Content Determination

      • Frances Egan

      Pages 217-228

   4. On the Principle of Charity and the Sources of Indeterminacy

      • Daniel Laurier

      Pages 229-248

   5. Davidson, Indeterminacy, and Measurement

      • David Davies

      Pages 249-265

5. Intentional Causation and Content Individuation

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 267-271

      PDF

   2. Davidson on Intentional Causation

      • Ausonio Marras

      Pages 273-285

   3. Externalism, Dedicto Beliefs, Proper Names and Reference Determination

      • Steven Davis

      Pages 287-309

   4. Two Concepts of Belief

      • Michel Seymour

      Pages 311-344

Philosophy of mind has been one of the most active fields in philosophy for the past three decades. One of the most significant factors in the development of this discipline has been the emergence of cognitive science and the interest philosophers have taken in the empirical study of mind. Another equally important factor has been the "naturalistic tum" brought about by W. V. Quine. His proposal that normative epistemology be replaced by empirical psychology marked a radical departure from the Fregean "anti­ psychologism" and "apriorism" that had characterized much of the analytic tradition in philosophy. But while Quine's program of naturalization called the attention of philosophers to empirical psychology, his conception of psychology was inspired by an austere behaviorism which shunned the mentalism of intentional psychology in the Brentanian and phenomenological tradition. Thus, while agreeing with Brentano that the "intentional idiom" could not be reduced to that of the natural sciences, Quine argued that it is of a piece with the indeterminacy of translation. Most contributors of this col­ lection share the cognitivist stance and believe that the mind needs to be explained rather than eliminated. Three main questions are actually confronting current philosophers of mind, each addressed by one or another of the contributors to the present collection.

• consciousness
• experience
• mind
• perception
• philosophy
• simulation

• Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, Canada

  Denis Fisette

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