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Peirce’s and Lewis’s Theories of Induction

  • Book
  • © 1969

Overview

Authors:
  1. Chung-Ying Cheng

    1. University of Hawaii, USA

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Table of contents (16 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-XIII
    Download chapter PDF

  2. Introduction

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 1-11

  3. Scope of Peirce’s Theory of Induction

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 12-16

  4. The Nature and Validity of Inference

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 17-31

  5. Probable Inference and Justifying Induction

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 32-38

  6. Requirements for the Validity of Induction

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 39-53

  7. Probability and the Validity of Induction

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 54-64

  8. A Non-Probabilistic Justification of Induction

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 65-82

  9. Concluding Remarks on Peirce’s Non-Probabilistic Justification on Induction

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 83-87

  10. Problems in Lewis’s Theory of Induction

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 88-93

  11. Induction and Analysis of Knowledge of Reality

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 94-104

  12. An “A Priori Analytical” Justification of Induction

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 105-119

  13. Implications of Lewis’ “A Priori Analytical” Justification of Induction

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 120-129

  14. Concluding Remarks on Lewis’ “A Priori Analytical” Justification of Induction

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 130-135

  15. Nature of Probability and Rational Credibility

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 136-148

  16. Criteria for Determining Rational Credibility

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 149-157

  17. Conclusion

    • Chung-Ying Cheng
    Pages 158-169

  18. Back Matter

    Pages 170-206
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Keywords

About this book

This book is based on my doctoral dissertation written at Harvard University in the year of 1963. My interest in Peirce was inspired by Professor D. C. Williams and that in Lewis by Professor Roderick Firth. To both of them lowe a great deal, not only in my study of Peirce and Lewis, but in my general approach toward the problems of knowledge and reality. Specifically, I wish to acknowledge Professor Williams for his patient and careful criticisms of the original manuscripts of this book. I also wish to thank Professor Firth and Professor Israel Scheffler for their many suggestive comments regarding my discussions of induc­ tion. However, any error in this study of Peirce and Lewis is completely due to myself. Chung-ying Cheng Honolulu, Hawaii March,1967 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE V SUMMARY IX CHAPTER I: Introduction I I. Problem of Justifying Induction and Proposal for Its Dissolution I 2. Two Types of Recent Arguments for the Validity of Induction 3 Arguments from Paradigm Cases and Uses of Words 4 3.

Authors and Affiliations

  • University of Hawaii, USA

    Chung-Ying Cheng

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Peirce’s and Lewis’s Theories of Induction

  • Authors: Chung-Ying Cheng

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9367-2

  • Publisher: Springer Dordrecht

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands 1969

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-94-011-8598-1Published: 01 January 1969

  • eBook ISBN: 978-94-011-9367-2Published: 06 December 2012

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: XIII, 206

  • Topics: Logic, Philosophy, general

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