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The Context of Explanation

  • Book
  • © 1993

Overview

Authors:
  1. Martin Bunzl

    1. Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, USA

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Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science (BSPS, volume 149)

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Table of contents (9 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xii
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  2. The Deductive-Nomological Model Briefly Revisited

    • Martin Bunzl
    Pages 1-10

  3. Causal Conception and Causal Connection

    • Martin Bunzl
    Pages 11-29

  4. Identity and Unification

    • Martin Bunzl
    Pages 30-41

  5. Pragmatics

    • Martin Bunzl
    Pages 42-58

  6. Statics and Dynamics

    • Martin Bunzl
    Pages 59-72

  7. Supervenience and Reductionism

    • Martin Bunzl
    Pages 73-84

  8. Laws

    • Martin Bunzl
    Pages 85-97

  9. Interpretation

    • Martin Bunzl
    Pages 98-110

  10. Causal Factuals

    • Martin Bunzl
    Pages 111-130

  11. Back Matter

    Pages 131-164
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Keywords

About this book

In this book Martin Bunzl considers the prospects for a general and comprehensive account of explanation, given the variety of interests that prompt explanations in science. Bunzl argues that any successful account of explanation must deal with two very different contexts - one static and one dynamic. Traditionally, theories of explanation have been built for the former of these two contexts. That is to say, they are designed to show how it is that a 'finished' body of scientific knowledge can be put to explanatory use. But finished sciences are few and far between. Real 'explanation' also occurs in a dynamical context in which questions are asked and answers are given as theories are in the process of being constructed. Here, Bunzl argues that attending to explanation produced under these dynamic circumstances undermines prominent features of the theory of explanation produced in the traditional static context.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, USA

    Martin Bunzl

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