Doing the Best We Can

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xiv

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2. Absolute Moral Obligation

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

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   2. Utilitarian Foundations

      • Fred Feldman

      Pages 3-15

   3. A Theory of Moral Obligation

      • Fred Feldman

      Pages 16-44

   4. Moral Objections to MO

      • Fred Feldman

      Pages 45-69

3. Iffy Oughts

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 71-71

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   2. Basic Iffy Oughts

      • Fred Feldman

      Pages 73-98

   3. Hypothetical Imperatives

      • Fred Feldman

      Pages 99-126

   4. Defeasible Commitment and Prima Facie Obligation

      • Fred Feldman

      Pages 127-144

4. Extensions

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 145-145

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   2. Individual Obligation and Group Welfare

      • Fred Feldman

      Pages 147-178

   3. What Ought to be

      • Fred Feldman

      Pages 179-196

   4. Conflicts of Obligation

      • Fred Feldman

      Pages 197-215

   5. Conclusions

      • Fred Feldman

      Pages 216-225

5. Back Matter

   Pages 227-246

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Several years ago I came across a marvelous little paper in which Hector-Neri Castaneda shows that standard versions of act utilitarian­ l ism are formally incoherent. I was intrigued by his argument. It had long seemed to me that I had a firm grasp on act utilitarianism. Indeed, it had often seemed to me that it was the clearest and most attractive of normative theories. Yet here was a simple and relatively uncontrover­ sial argument that showed, with only some trivial assumptions, that the doctrine is virtually unintelligible. The gist of Castaneda's argument is this: suppose we understand act utilitarianism to be the view that an act is obligatory if and only if its utility exceeds that of each alternative. Suppose it is obligatory for a certain person to perform an act with two parts - we can call it 'A & B'. Then, obviously enough, it is also obligatory for this person to perform the parts, A and B. If act utilitarianism were true, we appar­ ently could infer that the utility of A & B is higher than that of A, and higher than that of B (because A & B is obligatory, and the other acts are alternatives to A & B).

• Immanuel Kant
• Indian
• Utilitarianism
• access
• accessibility
• concept
• deontic logic
• individual
• morality
• perfect
• project
• projects
• subject
• tradition
• truth

• Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA

  Fred Feldman

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