The Logic of the Living Present

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-ix

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2. Constitutive Ordering: Experience and Objectivity

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

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   2. Idea and Thing

      • Yasuhiko Tomida

      Pages 3-143

3. The Logic of the Living Present

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 145-146

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   2. Translator’s Introduction

      • Daniel J. Herman

      Pages 147-154

   3. Dialectical Logic as the General Logic of Temporalization

      • Tran Duc Thao

      Pages 155-166

4. The Basic Grammar of Intercultural Texts

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 167-167

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   2. Phenomenology, the Question of Rationality and the Basic Grammar of Intercultural Texts

      • Hwa Yol Jung

      Pages 169-240

5. The Constitutive Foundation of Culture: Categories

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 241-241

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   2. The Doctrine of Categories and the Topology of Concern

      • Tze-Wan Kwan

      Pages 243-302

6. Back Matter

   Pages 303-312

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Some might ask "Why Locke's theory of knowledge now?" Though appreciated for his social philosophy, Locke has been criticized for his work in the field of epistemology ever since the publication of the Essay. It is even as if Locke serves only as an example of how not to think. When people criticize Locke, they usually cite the hostile commen­ taries of Berkeley, Kant, Husserl, or Sellars. But, one might ask, are they not all so eager to show the excellence of their own epistemo­ logical views that they distort and underestimate Locke's thought? Russell aptly noted in his History of Western Philosophy that: No one has yet succeeded in inventing a philosophy at once credible and self-consis­ tent. Locke aimed at credibility, and achieved it at the expense of consistency. Most of the great philosophers have done the opposite. A philosophy which is not self-consis­ tent cannot be wholly true, but a philosophy which is self-consistent can very well be wholly false. The most fruitful philosophies have contained glaring inconsistencies, but for that very reason have been partially true. There is no reason to suppose that a self­ consistent system contains more truth than one which, like Locke's, is obviously more or less wrong. (B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945], p. 613. ) Here Russell is uncommonly charitable with Locke.

• Chinese
• Edmund Husserl
• John Locke
• Orient
• culture
• dialectic
• interpret
• knowledge
• living
• logic
• objectivity
• phenomenology
• present
• structure
• translator

• The World Phenomenology Institute, USA

  Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka

Policies and ethics