Conceptual Change

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-XII

   PDF

2. Linguistic Relativity

   • Kendall L. Walton

   Pages 1-30

3. Something about Conceptual Schemes

   • Paul Ziff

   Pages 31-41

4. Prima Facie Generalizations

   • Romane Clark

   Pages 42-54

5. Change of belief or change of meaning?

   • Robert W. Binkley

   Pages 55-76

6. Conceptual Change

   • Wilfrid Sellars

   Pages 77-93

7. Evidence, Meaning and Conceptual Change: A Subjective Approach

   • Keith Lehrer

   Pages 94-122

8. Logic and Conceptual Change

   • Stephan Körner

   Pages 123-136

9. Some Comments on Professor Körner’s Paper

   • Joseph S. Ullian

   Pages 137-140

10. Conceptual Structures

    • Donald Hockney

    Pages 141-166

11. Theory Change in Science

    • Noretta Koertge

    Pages 167-198

12. Explanation and Reference

    • Hilary Putnam

    Pages 199-221

13. Referential Indeterminacy: A Response to Professor Putnam

    • Robert Barrett

    Pages 222-232

14. On Semantically Relevant Whatsits: A Semantics for Philosophy of Science

    • N. L. Wilson

    Pages 233-245

15. Back Matter

    Pages 246-286

    PDF

During Hallowe'en of 1970, the Department of Philosophy of the Univer­ sity of Western Ontario held its annual fall colloquium at London, On­ tario. The general topic of the sessions that year was conceptual change. The thirteen papers composing this volume stem more or less directly from those meetings; six of them are printed here virtually as delivered, while the remaining seven were subsequently written by invitation. The programme of the colloquium was to have consisted of major papers delivered by Professors Wilfrid Sellars, Stephan Korner, Paul Ziff and Hilary Putnam, with shorter commentary thereupon by Professors Robert Binkley, Joseph Ullian, Jerry Fodor and Robert Barrett, respec­ tively. And that is the way it happened, with one important exception: at the eleventh hour, Sellars and Binkley exchanged roles. This gave Binkley the rather unusual and challenging task of providing a suitable Sellarsian answer to a question not of his own asking - for Binkley's paper was written under Sellars' original title. Sellars' own contribution to the vo­ lume is perhaps more nearly what he would have presented as main speaker than a direct response to Binkley. However, it has seemed best, on balance, to attempt no further stylistic accommodation of the one paper to the other; their mutual philosophical relevance will be evident in any case. The editors would here like to extend special thanks to both Sellars and Binkley for their extraordinary efforts under the circumstances.

• Hilary Putnam
• bibliography
• concept
• indeterminacy
• logic
• philosophy
• philosophy of science
• semantic
• semantics
• structure
• subject

• The University of Western Ontario, London, Canada

  Glenn Pearce, Patrick Maynard

Policies and ethics