Scientific Knowledge

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xvi

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2. Causation

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 1-1

      PDF

   2. The Knowledge Context Kzt

      • James H. Fetzer

      Pages 3-22

   3. The Language Framework: L OR L?

      • James H. Fetzer

      Pages 23-45

   4. Syntax, Semantics, and Ontology

      • James H. Fetzer

      Pages 46-73

3. Explanation

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 75-75

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   2. Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance

      • James H. Fetzer

      Pages 77-103

   3. A Single Case Theory of Causal Explanation

      • James H. Fetzer

      Pages 104-136

   4. The Dispositional Construction of Theories

      • James H. Fetzer

      Pages 137-171

4. Corroboration

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 173-173

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   2. The Justification of Induction

      • James H. Fetzer

      Pages 175-201

   3. Confirmation and Corroboration

      • James H. Fetzer

      Pages 202-230

   4. Acceptance and Rejection Rules

      • James H. Fetzer

      Pages 231-263

   5. Rationality and Fallibility

      • James H. Fetzer

      Pages 264-296

5. Back Matter

   Pages 297-327

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With this defense of intensional realism as a philosophical foundation for understanding scientific procedures and grounding scientific knowledge, James Fetzer provides a systematic alternative to much of recent work on scientific theory. To Fetzer, the current state of understanding the 'laws' of nature, or the 'law-like' statements of scientific theories, appears to be one of philosophical defeat; and he is determined to overcome that defeat. Based upon his incisive advocacy of the single-case propensity interpretation of probability, Fetzer develops a coherent structure within which the central problems of the philosophy of science find their solutions. Whether the reader accepts the author's contentions may, in the end, depend upon ancient choices in the interpretation of experience and explanation, but there can be little doubt of Fetzer's spirited competence in arguing for setting ontology before epistemology, and within the analysis of language. To us, Fetzer's ambition is appealing, fusing, as he says, the substantive commitment of the Popperian with the conscientious sensitivity of the Hempelian to the technical precision required for justified explication. To Fetzer, science is the objective pursuit of fallible general knowledge. This innocent character­ ization, which we suppose most scientists would welcome, receives a most careful elaboration in this book; it will demand equally careful critical con­ sideration. Center for the Philosophy and ROBERT S. COHEN History of Science, MARX W. WARTOFSKY Boston University October 1981 v TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITORIAL PREFACE v FOREWORD xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xv PART I: CAUSATION 1.

• Charles Sanders Peirce
• Karl R. Popper
• Theory of Signs
• history of science
• philosophy of science
• probability
• realism
• science
• semantics

`...an outstanding success within its genre ... no other approach is currently better positioned to attain Al's theoretical goals, to support its technological aims, or to secure its thorough justification as a genuine science.'
Al Magazine

• New College of the University of South Florida, USA

  James H. Fetzer

Policies and ethics