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Explanation, Causation and Deduction

  • Book
  • © 1985

Overview

Authors:
  1. Fred Wilson

    1. Philosophy Department, University of Toronto, Canada

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Part of the book series: The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science (WONS, volume 26)

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Table of contents (4 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xviii
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  2. The Deduction Model of Explanation: A Statement

    • Fred Wilson
    Pages 1-71

  3. The Reason Ability of the Deductive Model

    • Fred Wilson
    Pages 73-172

  4. Explanations and Explainings

    • Fred Wilson
    Pages 173-342

  5. Conclusion

    • Fred Wilson
    Pages 343-343

  6. Back Matter

    Pages 345-385
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Keywords

About this book

The purpose of this essay is to defend the deductive-nomological model of explanation against a number of criticisms that have been made of it. It has traditionally been thought that scientific explanations were causal and that scientific explanations involved deduction from laws. In recent years, however, this three-fold identity has been challenged: there are, it is argued, causal explanations that are not scientific, scientific explanations that are not deductive, deductions from laws that are neither causal explanations nor scientific explanations, and causal explanations that involve no deductions from laws. The aim of the present essay is to defend the traditional identities, and to show that the more recent attempts at invalidating them fail in their object. More specifically, this essay argues that a Humean version of the deductive-nomological model of explanation can be defended as (1) the correct account of scientific explanation of individual facts and processes, and as (2) the correct account of causal explanations of individual facts and processes. The deductive-nomological model holds that to explain an event E, say that a is G, one must find some initial conditions C, say that a is F, and a law or theory T such that T and C jointly entail E, and both are essential to the deduction.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Philosophy Department, University of Toronto, Canada

    Fred Wilson

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Explanation, Causation and Deduction

  • Authors: Fred Wilson

  • Series Title: The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5249-2

  • Publisher: Springer Dordrecht

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: D. Reidel Publishing Company 1985

  • Hardcover ISBN: 978-90-277-1856-3Due: 30 June 1985

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-94-010-8818-3Published: 26 September 2011

  • eBook ISBN: 978-94-009-5249-2Published: 06 December 2012

  • Series ISSN: 1566-659X

  • Series E-ISSN: 2215-1974

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: 400

  • Topics: Philosophy of Science

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