Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xx

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2. AGM Theory and Artificial Intelligence

   • Raúl Carnota, Ricardo Rodríguez

   Pages 1-42

3. Changing the Scientific Corpus

   • Sven Ove Hansson

   Pages 43-58

4. Idealizations, Intertheory Explanations and Conditionals

   • Hans Rott

   Pages 59-75

5. Abductive Belief Revision in Science

   • Gerhard Schurz

   Pages 77-104

6. A Structuralist Framework for the Logic of Theory Change

   • Sebastian Enqvist

   Pages 105-135

7. Using Conceptual Spaces to Model the Dynamics of Empirical Theories

   • Peter Gärdenfors, Frank Zenker

   Pages 137-153

8. A Note on Theory Change and Belief Revision

   • Bengt Hansson

   Pages 155-162

9. Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change

   • Horacio Arló-Costa, Arthur Paul Pedersen

   Pages 163-212

10. Rational Belief Changes for Collective Agents

    • David Westlund

    Pages 213-224

11. The Best of All PossibleWorlds: Where Interrogative Games Meet Research Agendas

    • Emmanuel Genot

    Pages 225-252

12. Functional vs. Relational Approaches to Belief Revision

    • Erik J. Olsson

    Pages 253-268

13. Knowledge as True Belief

    • Isaac Levi

    Pages 269-302

14. Reasoning About Belief Revision

    • Caroline Semmling, Heinrich Wansing

    Pages 303-328

15. Changing Minds About Climate Change: Belief Revision, Coherence, and Emotion

    • Paul Thagard, Scott Findlay

    Pages 329-345

16. Rationality in Flux – Formal Representations of Methodological Change

    • Jonas Nilsson, Sten Lindström

    Pages 347-356

17. Back Matter

    Pages 357-359

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Belief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes (typically) in the light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references and researchers working in both domains. One may speculate as to what has brought about this surprising, and perhaps unfortunate, state of affairs. One factor may be that while belief revision theory has traditionally been pursued in a bottom- up manner, focusing on the endeavors of single inquirers, philosophers of science, inspired by logical empiricism, have tended to be more interested in science as a multi-agent or agent-independent phenomenon.

• AGM Theory
• Abduction
• Belief revision
• Conceptual spaces
• Dynamic Doxastic Logic
• Explanation
• Idealization
• Induction
• Logical Empiricism
• Research Agenda

"[...] offers a rich and up-to-date inventory of contributions, which cover almost all the issues on the border between AGM and philosophy of science, laying the bases for a further, fruitful exploration of this exciting field of research."

Gustavo Cevolani (University of Bologna, Italy) and Roberto Festa (University of Trieste, Italy)

• Dept. Philosophy, University of Lund, Lund, Sweden

  Erik J. Olsson, Sebastian Enqvist

Policies and ethics