Advances in Economic Design

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-XIII

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2. Introduction

   1. Introduction

      • Semih Koray, M. R. Sertel

      Pages 1-15

3. Social Choice and Electoral Systems

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 17-17

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   2. Selecting a Social Choice Rule — An Exploratory Panel Study

      • Murat R. Sertel, Ayça E. G. Kara

      Pages 19-52

   3. Weighted Scoring Rules That Maximize Condorcet Efficiency

      • William V. Gehrlein

      Pages 53-63

   4. Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians and the Down-Up Problem

      • Hans Gersbach

      Pages 65-76

4. Buyers and Sellers

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 77-77

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   2. On Determination of Optimal Reserve Price in Auctions with Common Knowledge about Ranking of Valuations

      • A. Alexander Elbittar, M. Utku Ünver

      Pages 79-94

   3. On Auctions with Interest Linkages among Bidders

      • Ottorino Chillemi

      Pages 95-104

   4. Substitutes, Complements, and Equilibrium in Two-Sided Market Models

      • V. I. Danilov, G. A. Koshevoy, C. Lang

      Pages 105-123

   5. Core Convergence in Two-Sided Matching Markets

      • Aljoša Feldin

      Pages 125-150

5. Bargaining

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 151-151

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   2. Can and Should the Nash Program Be Looked at as a Part of Mechanism Theory?

      • Walter Trockel

      Pages 153-174

   3. Impossibility of a Walrasian Bargaining Solution

      • Murat R. Sertel, Muhamet Yildiz

      Pages 175-182

   4. Characterization of Competitive Allocations and the Nash Bargaining Problem

      • A. I. Sotskov

      Pages 183-204

   5. Kalai-Smorodinsky and Maschler-Perles Solutions under Pre-donation

      • Benan Zeki Orbay

      Pages 205-216

6. Coalitional Stability and Efficiency

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 217-217

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   2. Stable Cartel Structures in a Dismantling Game

      • Sylvie Thoron

      Pages 219-232

   3. A Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function and the Core in Games with Externalities

      • Sergio Currarini, Marco Marini

      Pages 233-249

   4. Coalition Structural Games and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

      • Göksel Aşan, M. Remzi Sanver

      Pages 251-259

This book, Advances in Economic Design, celebrates the birth of SED, the Society for Economic Design. It grew out of SED 2000, the first International Conference of the Society for Economic Design, which took place in istanbul during 23-27 lune, 2000. While it is not a proceedings or even a selected proceedings volume, it nevertheless contains many chapters which derive from papers presented at SED 2000, although they have typically been substantially reworked, extended and deepened. Of course, all the papers published in this book were anonymously refe­ reed. As a collection of selected essays, the book displays the state of the art across a broad spectrum of theoretical questions and topics and areas of application which economic designers are investigating. This characteristic of the book is reflected in its organization into seven parts: (A) Social Choice and Electoral Systems, (B) Buyers and SeIlers, (C) Bargaining, (D) Coalitional Stability and Efficiency, (E) Regulating and Organizing Markets, (F) Designing Rights, (G) Information. Most of the chapters of this book were edited for their English. Ms. ludith Tucker edited Chapters A2, A3, BI, B3, Cl, C4, DI, D2, D3, E2, E3, F2, F3 and F4, while Dr. Noah Hardy linguistically edited Chapters B2, B4 and C3. We thank Ms. Tucker and Dr. Hardy for their diligent support in this regard.

• Bargaining
• Economic Design
• Electoral Systems
• Mechanisms
• Ranking
• Social Choice
• morality

• Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey

  Murat R. Sertel

• Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey

  Semih Koray

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