Public Procurement in the European Union

Alexander Rhode investigates performance-oriented measures of Contracting Authorities in public tenders conducted within the EU. He finds that Contracting Authorities can improve their performance and attract more suppliers by publishing (as precise as possible) starting prices in the beginning of a tender. First, he reports that compared with private-sector negotiations, starting prices do not create entry barriers in public procurement. Second, he finds that increased numerical precision of starting prices is linearly correlated with better performance and a higher number of bids. In public procurement, suppliers tend to attribute increased credibility to precise starting prices which reduces their (perceived) entry risks.

• Public Procurement in the European Union
• Contracting Authorities
• Procurement Performance in Tenders
• Public tender
• Tender
• Tender performance
• Anchor effects
• Anchoring
• Starting prices
• Precision effects
• Price ranges
• Performance-oriented measures
• Investigation of starting price publication
• Derivation of managerial

• Berlin, Germany

  Alexander Rhode

Alexander Rhode studied business administration at the University of Mannheim and the HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management. He completed his doctoral thesis under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Uta Herbst at the University of Potsdam. He works for a leading global consultancy firm focusing on the healthcare sector.

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