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Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision

  • Book
  • © 2011

Overview

Authors:
  1. Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer

    1. Wiesbaden, Germany

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  • Gives an insight into contract design and incentive provision
  • Three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems
  • The book is aimed at scholars and students of business economics

Part of the book series: Edition KWV (EKWV)

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Table of contents (7 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xi
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  2. Introduction

    • Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
    Pages 1-7

  4. Contract Design and Incentive Provision: Experimental Evidence

    1. Front Matter

      Pages 91-91
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    2. Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence

      • Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
      Pages 93-128

    3. Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidence

      • Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
      Pages 129-184

    4. Behavioral Biases and Cognitive Reflection

      • Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
      Pages 185-195

  5. Back Matter

    Pages 196-211
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Keywords

About this book

Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wiesbaden, Germany

    Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer

About the author

Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer published her work with Kölner Wissenschaftsverlag until 2018.

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision

  • Authors: Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer

  • Series Title: Edition KWV

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9

  • Publisher: Springer Gabler Wiesbaden

  • eBook Packages: Business and Economics, Economics and Finance (R0)

  • Copyright Information: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2011

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-3-658-24132-2Published: 01 March 2019

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-658-24133-9Published: 19 February 2019

  • Series ISSN: 2946-0301

  • Series E-ISSN: 2946-031X

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: XI, 211

  • Number of Illustrations: 1 b/w illustrations

  • Additional Information: Originally published by Kölner Wissenschaftsverlag, Köln, 2011

  • Topics: Sales/Distribution

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