Skip to main content
Book cover

On Optimal Population Paths

  • Book
  • © 1977

Overview

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (LNE, volume 142)

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this book

eBook USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access

Licence this eBook for your library

Institutional subscriptions

Table of contents (6 chapters)

Keywords

About this book

The overall purpose of this monograph is to integrate and critically evaluate the existing literature in the area of optimal joint savings population programs. The existing diverse presentations are all seen to be discussions within a unified framework. The central problem is to compare the desirability of alternative inter-temporal sequences of total savings and population sizes. Of critical importance is whether one regards persons as the fundamental moral entities or whether one takes Sidgwick's viewpoint that something good being the result of one's action is the baSic reason for dOing anything. The latter viewpoint is consistent with defining a complete social preference ordering over these alternative sequences. Since part of one's interest is to evaluate the consequences of various ethical beliefs a comยญ parative study of several such orderings is presented; in particular the Mill-Wolfe average utilitarian, and Sidgwick-Meade classical utilitarian) formulations. A possible problem with the social preference ordering approach is that the ordering may indicate the desirability of increasing the population size, if this increases the total amount of good, even though people may receive less than the welfare subsistence level of consumption. However, there are other ways of evaluating actions and, if persons are the fundamental moral entities, then perhaps these actions should be evaluated by their implications for the rights of individuals i. e. people Who are currently alive, people who one can predict will exist in the future (e. g.

Authors and Affiliations

  • London School of Economics and Political Science, London, England

    John S. Lane

Bibliographic Information

Publish with us