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Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

  • Book
  • © 1987

Overview

Editors:
  1. Günter Bamberg

    1. Lehrstuhl für Statistik, Universität Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany

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  2. Klaus Spremann

    1. Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Ulm, Ulm, Germany

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

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Table of contents (26 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-XVIII
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  2. Prologue

    1. Prologue

      • Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann
      Pages 1-2

  3. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing

    1. Agent and Principal

      • Klaus Spremann
      Pages 3-37

    2. Managerial Contracting with Public and Private Information

      • Hellmuth Milde
      Pages 39-59

    3. Risk Sharing and Subcontracting

      • Günter Bamberg
      Pages 61-79

  4. Information and Incentives

    1. Information Systems for Principal-Agent Problems

      • Volker Firchau
      Pages 81-92

    2. Information Systems and the Design of Optimal Contracts

      • Marina Blickle
      Pages 93-103

    3. Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for the Allocation of Public Goods

      • Helmut Funke
      Pages 105-116

    4. Incentives to Forecast Honestly

      • Andreas Pfingsten
      Pages 117-133

  5. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard

    1. Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues

      • Helmut Bester, Martin Hellwig
      Pages 135-166

    2. The Liquidation Decision as a Principal Agent Problem

      • Peter Swoboda
      Pages 167-177

    3. On Stakeholders’ Unanimity

      • Jochen E. M. Wilhelm
      Pages 179-204

  6. Financial Contracting and Dividends

    1. Signalling and Market Behavior

      • Andreas Gruber
      Pages 205-227

    2. Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information

      • Thomas Hartmann-Wendels
      Pages 229-253

    3. Why Leasing? An Introduction to Comparative Contractual Analysis

      • Jan P. Krahnen, Georg Meran
      Pages 255-280

  8. Coordination in Groups

    1. Managers as Principals and Agents

      • Martin J. Beckmann
      Pages 379-388
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Keywords

About this book

Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco­ nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap­ plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza­ tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese­ arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa­ tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.

Editors and Affiliations

  • Lehrstuhl für Statistik, Universität Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany

    Günter Bamberg

  • Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Ulm, Ulm, Germany

    Klaus Spremann

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

  • Editors: Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1

  • Publisher: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1987

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-642-75060-1Published: 06 December 2012

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: XVIII, 533

  • Topics: Economics, general, Organization

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