Animal Mind — Human Mind

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-x

   PDF

2. Introduction

   • D. R. Griffin

   Pages 1-12

3. Brain Functions and Mental Processes

   • S. A. Hillyard, F. E. Bloom

   Pages 13-32

4. Some Perspectives on the Evolution of Intelligence and the Brain

   • W. Hodos

   Pages 33-55

5. Mental Processes in the Nonverbal Hemisphere

   • J. Levy

   Pages 57-73

6. Risk-benefit Assessment in Animals

   • R. H. Drent

   Pages 75-93

7. The Ecological Conditions of Thinking

   • D. Dörner

   Pages 95-112

8. Social Knowledge in Free-ranging Primates

   • H. Kummer

   Pages 113-130

9. Primate Social Intelligence: Contributions from the Laboratory

   • W. A. Mason

   Pages 131-143

10. Internal Representation

    • L. A. Cooper

    Pages 145-158

11. Problem Solving

    • G. Lüer

    Pages 159-176

12. Ascent of Apes

    • D. J. Gillan

    Pages 177-200

13. Cognitive Knowledge and Executive Control: Metacognition

    • R. H. Kluwe

    Pages 201-224

14. On the Evolution of Cognitive Processes and Performances

    • F. Klix

    Pages 225-250

15. Study of Vertebrate Communication — Its Cognitive Implications

    • C. G. Beer

    Pages 251-267

16. The Insect Mind: Physics or Metaphysics?

    • J. L. Gould, C. G. Gould

    Pages 269-297

17. Cognitive Aspects of Ape Language Experiments

    • C. A. Ristau, D. Robbins

    Pages 299-330

18. Neuropsychological Approaches State of the Art Report

    • H. J. Neville, S. A. Hillyard, F. E. Bloom, T. H. Bullock, R. J. Cohen, A. Elepfandt et al.

    Pages 333-353

19. Evolutionary Ecology of Thinking State of the Art Report

    • M. Dawkins, N. Bischof, D. Dürner, R. H. Drent, J. R. Krebs, H. Kummer et al.

    Pages 354-373

20. Comparative Approaches to Animal Cognition State of the Art Report

    • W. Kintsch, R. H. Brown, J. Cerella, J. H. Crook, J. A. Fodor, D. J. Gillan et al.

    Pages 374-388

the oleic acid on a live and wriggling sister or mother and refrain from evicting her from our hive. But does the occur­ rence of unintelligent behavior suffice to demonstrate the total absence of mental experience under any circumstances? Ethologists from some distant galaxy could easily discern ex­ amples of stupid and maladaptive behavior in our own species. But do instances of human stupidity prove that none of us is ever consciously aware of what he is dOing? No available evi­ dence compels us to believe that insects, or any other animals, experience any sort of consciousness, or intentionally plan any of their behavior. But neither are we compelled to believe the contrary. In areas where data are few and of limited rel­ evance, dogmatic negativity can easily limit what scientists even try to investigate, and thus perhaps delay or prevent im­ portant insights and discoveries. Many of the participants agreed that a good starting point would be to consider what we know of our own thinking, subjec­ tive feelings, and consciousness, and then move on to inquire whether other species experience anything similar. Such an ap­ proach was once considered fallaciously anthropomorphic. But it seems now to be widely if not universally recognized that this is a serious objection only if one has already assumed in advance that conscious thinking is uniquely human, and the accu­ sation of anthropomorphism is then merely a reiteration of the prior conviction.

• Evolution (Biol.)
• Gehirn
• Intelligenz
• animals
• brain
• evolution
• insects
• intelligence

Policies and ethics