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Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information

An Experimental Study

  • Book
  • © 1996

Overview

Authors:
  1. Wolfgang Ryll

    1. Bad Homburg v.d.H., Germany

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (LNE, volume 440)

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Table of contents (8 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-VIII
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  2. Introduction

    • Wolfgang Ryll
    Pages 1-5

  3. The Game-Theoretic Model and Equilibrium Sets

    • Wolfgang Ryll
    Pages 7-23

  4. Experimental Design and Organisation of the Experiment

    • Wolfgang Ryll
    Pages 25-29

  5. Experimental Results

    • Wolfgang Ryll
    Pages 31-76

  6. Learning Theories

    • Wolfgang Ryll
    Pages 77-97

  7. Monte-Carlo Simulations and Testing of Learning Direction Theory Against a Simple Alternative Theory

    • Wolfgang Ryll
    Pages 99-120

  8. Comparison of the Results of Direction Learning and the Simple Alternative Theory

    • Wolfgang Ryll
    Pages 121-140

  9. Summary

    • Wolfgang Ryll
    Pages 141-142

  10. Back Matter

    Pages 171-176
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Keywords

About this book

We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989» and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973». The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P'ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting parties may have. P'ng constructs a model of one-sided incomplete information where the settlement terms are given exogenously. Schweizer (1989), on the other hand, extends P'ng's model and allows for two-sided asymmetric information where the settlement terms are determined endogenously.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bad Homburg v.d.H., Germany

    Wolfgang Ryll

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information

  • Book Subtitle: An Experimental Study

  • Authors: Wolfgang Ryll

  • Series Title: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61467-5

  • Publisher: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1996

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-3-540-61304-6Published: 12 July 1996

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-642-61467-5Published: 06 December 2012

  • Series ISSN: 0075-8442

  • Series E-ISSN: 2196-9957

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: VIII, 176

  • Number of Illustrations: 7 b/w illustrations

  • Topics: Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods

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