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Rings in Auctions

An Experimental Approach

  • Book
  • © 1997

Overview

Authors:
  1. Angelo Artale

    1. Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (LNE, volume 447)

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Table of contents (6 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-X
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  2. Introduction

    • Angelo Artale
    Pages 1-4

  3. The Experiment

    • Angelo Artale
    Pages 5-51

  4. A Descriptive Model

    • Angelo Artale
    Pages 53-61

  5. Mechanisms of Collusion

    • Angelo Artale
    Pages 63-95

  6. Two Extensions

    • Angelo Artale
    Pages 97-102

  7. Conclusion

    • Angelo Artale
    Pages 103-106

  8. Back Matter

    Pages 107-174
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Keywords

About this book

In auctions, bidders compete with one another in their attempt to 1 purchase the goods that are up for sale • But buyer competition may be reduced or disappear when a ring of colluding bidders is present. The purpose of the participants to a ring is to eliminate buyer competition and to realize a gain over vendors. When all participants are members of the ring, this is done by purchasing the item at the reserve price and splitting the spoils (the difference between the item market value and the reserve price) among the participants. "The term ring apparently derives from the fact that in a settlement sale following the auction, members of the collusive arrangement form a circle or ring to facilitate observation of their trading behavior by the ring leader" (Cassady jr. (1967)). If the coalition members knew other players' values, the problem faced by the ring might be easily solved: the player with the highest value should submit a serious bid and the other members, on the contrary, only phony bids. However, ring participants do not usually know the values of other members. Therefore, ring members have to find out some mechanism which selects the player who has to bid seriously and, eventually, esta­ blish side payments paid to each of the losers2.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

    Angelo Artale

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Rings in Auctions

  • Book Subtitle: An Experimental Approach

  • Authors: Angelo Artale

  • Series Title: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59158-7

  • Publisher: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1997

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-3-540-61930-7Published: 28 January 1997

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-642-59158-7Published: 06 December 2012

  • Series ISSN: 0075-8442

  • Series E-ISSN: 2196-9957

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: X, 174

  • Number of Illustrations: 8 b/w illustrations

  • Topics: Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods

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