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The Alternating Double Auction Market

A Game Theoretic and Experimental Investigation

  • Book
  • © 1998

Overview

Authors:
  1. Abdolkarim Sadrieh

    1. Laboratorium für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (LNE, volume 466)

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Table of contents (7 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-vii
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  2. Introduction

    • Abdolkarim Sadrieh
    Pages 1-5

  3. The Alternating Double Auction Market Game

    • Abdolkarim Sadrieh
    Pages 6-13

  4. The Simplified Alternating Double Auction Market - A Game Theoretic Analysis

    • Abdolkarim Sadrieh
    Pages 14-176

  5. An Experimental Investigation of the Alternating Double Auction Market

    • Abdolkarim Sadrieh
    Pages 177-257

  6. Concluding Remarks

    • Abdolkarim Sadrieh
    Pages 258-260

  7. References

    • Abdolkarim Sadrieh
    Pages 261-264

  8. Appendix

    • Abdolkarim Sadrieh
    Pages 265-352
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Keywords

About this book

The alternating double auction market institution is presented as a discrete time version of the open outcry market. The game in extensive form is analyzed in an almost perfect information setting, using the concept of subgame perfectness. By applying two new equilibrium selection criteria, a general existence result is obtained for "impatience equilibria" of the game. All such equilibria are shown to have unique properties concerning the traded quantities and prices. The most important results are that the equilibrium prices are independent of the number of traders and are always very close to - if not inside - the range of competitive prices. The latter can be evaluated as game theoretic support for the convergence of prices to the competitive price. The process of price formation is traced by applying the learning direction theory and introducing the "anchor price hypothesis".

Authors and Affiliations

  • Laboratorium für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

    Abdolkarim Sadrieh

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