Bargaining over Time Allocation

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-IX

   PDF

2. Introduction

   • Miriam Beblo

   Pages 1-7

3. Theories on intrafamily time allocation

   • Miriam Beblo

   Pages 9-24

4. Empirical evidence on intrafamily time allocation

   • Miriam Beblo

   Pages 25-36

5. The strategic aspect of female labor supply

   • Miriam Beblo

   Pages 37-66

6. A panel-econometric analysis of the division of housework time

   • Miriam Beblo

   Pages 67-85

7. Leisure — A model on private provision of family public goods

   • Miriam Beblo

   Pages 87-98

8. The leisure gap between working parents

   • Miriam Beblo

   Pages 99-115

9. Resume

   • Miriam Beblo

   Pages 117-124

10. Back Matter

    Pages 125-140

    PDF

In this book, time use behavior within households is modeled as the outcome of a bargaining process between family members who bargain over household resource allocation and the intrafamily distribution of welfare. In view of trends such as rising female employment along with falling fertility rates and increasing divorce rates, a strategic aspect of female employment is analyzed in a dynamic family bargaining framework. The division of housework between spouses and the observed leisure differential between women and men are investigated within non-cooperative bargaining settings. The models developed are tested empirically using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and the German Time Budget Survey.

• Altern
• Bargaining
• Economics of Gender
• Family Decision Making
• Female Employment
• Time Allocation
• Time Use
• income
• women

• Forschungsbereich Arbeitsmärkte, Personalmanagement und Soziale Sicherung, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim, Deutschland

  Miriam Beblo

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