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  • © 1992

Experimental Duopoly Markets with Demand Inertia

Game-Playing Experiments and the Strategy Method

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (LNE, volume 391)

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Table of contents (8 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-X
  2. Introduction

    • Claudia Keser
    Pages 1-4
  3. The Model

    • Claudia Keser
    Pages 5-17
  4. The Experimental Design

    • Claudia Keser
    Pages 18-21
  5. Results of the Game-Playing Experiments

    • Claudia Keser
    Pages 22-37
  6. Results of the Strategy Tournaments

    • Claudia Keser
    Pages 38-110
  7. Comparison with Related Studies

    • Claudia Keser
    Pages 125-132
  8. Summary

    • Claudia Keser
    Pages 133-137
  9. Back Matter

    Pages 138-154

About this book

This report portrays the results of experimental research on dynamic duopoly markets with demand inertia. Two methods of experimentation are studied: game-playing experiments where subjects interact spontaneously via computer terminals, and computer tournaments between strategies designed by subjects. The principal aim of this study is the understanding of boundedly rational decision making in the dynamic duopoly situation. 1. 1 Motivation The experiments examine a multistage duopoly game where prices in each period are the only decision variables. Sales depend on current prices and also on past sales (demand inertia). Applying the game-theoretic concept of subgame perfect equilibrium, the game is solved by backward induction. The result is a uniquely determined system of decision rules. However, we can hardly expect that human beings behave according to the equilibrium strategy of this game. It is unlikely that subjects are able to compute the equilibrium. And even if a subject is able to compute it, he might not make use of this knowledge. Only if he expects the others to behave according to the equilibrium, it is optimal for him to play the equilibrium strategy. We have evidence from several earlier experimental studies on oligopoly markets that, even in less complex oligopoly situations where the equilibrium solutions are very easy to compute, human behavior often is different from what is prescribed by normative theory. ! Normative theory is based on the concept of ideal rationality. However, human capabilities impose cognitive limits on rationality.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Institut für Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Bonn, Bonn 1, Germany

    Claudia Keser

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Experimental Duopoly Markets with Demand Inertia

  • Book Subtitle: Game-Playing Experiments and the Strategy Method

  • Authors: Claudia Keser

  • Series Title: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48144-4

  • Publisher: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1992

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-3-540-56090-6Published: 17 December 1992

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-642-48144-4Published: 06 December 2012

  • Series ISSN: 0075-8442

  • Series E-ISSN: 2196-9957

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: X, 150

  • Topics: Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods

Buy it now

Buying options

eBook USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access