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Firms, Markets, and Contracts

Contributions to Neoinstitutional Economics

  • Conference proceedings
  • © 1996

Overview

Editors:
  1. Arnold Picot

    1. Institut für Organisation, Universität München, München, Germany

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  2. Ekkehart Schlicht

    1. Volkswirtschaftliches Institut, Universität München, München, Germany

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

Part of the book series: Contributions to Economics (CE)

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Table of contents (17 papers)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-VIII
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  2. Debt as an Option to Own in the Theory of Ownership Rights

    • Georg Nöldeke, Klaus M. Schmidt
    Pages 1-17

  3. Asymmetric Information and the Horizontal Integration of Firms

    • R. Wagner
    Pages 18-35

  4. Short-Termism and the Market for Corporate Control

    • Monika Schnitzer
    Pages 36-58

  5. The Influence of Transaction Costs in Labor Markets on the Organization of Industry

    • F. Waldenberger
    Pages 59-75

  6. Information Rent and Technology Choice in a Regulated Firm

    • Steinar Vagstad
    Pages 76-94

  7. Constitutional Contracting and Corporate Constitution

    • Birgitta Wolff
    Pages 95-108

  8. Collusion and Budget Distortions in Hierarchical Organizations

    • Joachim H. Wessels
    Pages 109-131

  9. Long-Term Franchise Contracts: A Closer Look at the Hold-Up Problem

    • Ulf Schiller
    Pages 132-152

  10. Capital Structure, the Risk Incentive Problem, and Repeated Investment Opportunities

    • Werner Neus
    Pages 153-164

  11. Financial Contracting with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

    • Mark Wahrenburg
    Pages 165-184

  12. On the Rationality of Kidnaps, Blackguards, and Hostages

    • Bettina Mohr, Udo Schmidt-Mohr
    Pages 185-199

  13. Information Problems in the Market for Medical Services

    • Sabine Richard
    Pages 200-219

  14. Data Envelopment Analysis: A Basis for Incentive Contracting

    • Eva Hoffmann, Frank Hoffmann
    Pages 220-244

  15. Environmental Problems from a Property Rights Perspective

    • Marita Balks
    Pages 245-262

  16. Efficient Allocation of an Indivisible Good: a Mechanism Design Problem under Uncertainty

    • Chun-Lei Yang
    Pages 263-272

  17. Risk Sharing Markets and Export Production

    • Udo Broll
    Pages 273-279

  18. Slot Allocation in the United States A Transaction Cost Economics Analysis

    • Sabine J. Langner
    Pages 280-298
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Keywords

About this book

Modern institutional economics witnesses a merging of formal and informal strands of theorizing. This development has offered new and vigorous perspectives which avoid both arbitrariness and theoretical sterility. The essays on contract theory gathered here exemplify this development. They propone new results on central issues in contractual theorizing. The theory of the firm in its variegated aspects forms, naturally, the core of the present set of contributions. Issues of ownership, integration, delegation, and finan­ ce are analyzed. Some contributions use the theoretical approach of contract theory to explore other issues, like medical care, public good problems, the economics of crime, environmental economics, and international trade. The contributors are leading young economists. They have participated in one or se­ veral classes of the 'International Summer School on the New Institutional Economics' which has been organized by Rudolf Richter in the years 1988 through 1994 and is now continued by Urs Schweizer. The theoretical style of these contributions has been influ­ enced by this experience. This collection of essays is intended to express the thanks of the contributors to Rudolf Richter. His initiatives for scholarly instruction and for inter­ national exchange of ideas have helped to create and to diffuse the understanding of and the engagement for the new institutional economics in Europe.

Editors and Affiliations

  • Institut für Organisation, Universität München, München, Germany

    Arnold Picot

  • Volkswirtschaftliches Institut, Universität München, München, Germany

    Ekkehart Schlicht

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Firms, Markets, and Contracts

  • Book Subtitle: Contributions to Neoinstitutional Economics

  • Editors: Arnold Picot, Ekkehart Schlicht

  • Series Title: Contributions to Economics

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46988-6

  • Publisher: Physica Heidelberg

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 1996

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-3-7908-0947-3Published: 16 August 1996

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-642-46988-6Published: 06 December 2012

  • Series ISSN: 1431-1933

  • Series E-ISSN: 2197-7178

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: VIII, 299

  • Topics: Organization, Economics, general

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