Firms, Markets, and Contracts

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-VIII

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2. Debt as an Option to Own in the Theory of Ownership Rights

   • Georg Nöldeke, Klaus M. Schmidt

   Pages 1-17

3. Asymmetric Information and the Horizontal Integration of Firms

   • R. Wagner

   Pages 18-35

4. Short-Termism and the Market for Corporate Control

   • Monika Schnitzer

   Pages 36-58

5. The Influence of Transaction Costs in Labor Markets on the Organization of Industry

   • F. Waldenberger

   Pages 59-75

6. Information Rent and Technology Choice in a Regulated Firm

   • Steinar Vagstad

   Pages 76-94

7. Constitutional Contracting and Corporate Constitution

   • Birgitta Wolff

   Pages 95-108

8. Collusion and Budget Distortions in Hierarchical Organizations

   • Joachim H. Wessels

   Pages 109-131

9. Long-Term Franchise Contracts: A Closer Look at the Hold-Up Problem

   • Ulf Schiller

   Pages 132-152

10. Capital Structure, the Risk Incentive Problem, and Repeated Investment Opportunities

    • Werner Neus

    Pages 153-164

11. Financial Contracting with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

    • Mark Wahrenburg

    Pages 165-184

12. On the Rationality of Kidnaps, Blackguards, and Hostages

    • Bettina Mohr, Udo Schmidt-Mohr

    Pages 185-199

13. Information Problems in the Market for Medical Services

    • Sabine Richard

    Pages 200-219

14. Data Envelopment Analysis: A Basis for Incentive Contracting

    • Eva Hoffmann, Frank Hoffmann

    Pages 220-244

15. Environmental Problems from a Property Rights Perspective

    • Marita Balks

    Pages 245-262

16. Efficient Allocation of an Indivisible Good: a Mechanism Design Problem under Uncertainty

    • Chun-Lei Yang

    Pages 263-272

17. Risk Sharing Markets and Export Production

    • Udo Broll

    Pages 273-279

18. Slot Allocation in the United States A Transaction Cost Economics Analysis

    • Sabine J. Langner

    Pages 280-298

Modern institutional economics witnesses a merging of formal and informal strands of theorizing. This development has offered new and vigorous perspectives which avoid both arbitrariness and theoretical sterility. The essays on contract theory gathered here exemplify this development. They propone new results on central issues in contractual theorizing. The theory of the firm in its variegated aspects forms, naturally, the core of the present set of contributions. Issues of ownership, integration, delegation, and finan­ ce are analyzed. Some contributions use the theoretical approach of contract theory to explore other issues, like medical care, public good problems, the economics of crime, environmental economics, and international trade. The contributors are leading young economists. They have participated in one or se­ veral classes of the 'International Summer School on the New Institutional Economics' which has been organized by Rudolf Richter in the years 1988 through 1994 and is now continued by Urs Schweizer. The theoretical style of these contributions has been influ­ enced by this experience. This collection of essays is intended to express the thanks of the contributors to Rudolf Richter. His initiatives for scholarly instruction and for inter­ national exchange of ideas have helped to create and to diffuse the understanding of and the engagement for the new institutional economics in Europe.

• Institutionelle Ökonomie
• Kontrakttheorie
• Theorie der Unternehmung
• contract theory
• institutional economics
• organizations
• production
• theory of the firm

• Institut für Organisation, Universität München, München, Germany

  Arnold Picot

• Volkswirtschaftliches Institut, Universität München, München, Germany

  Ekkehart Schlicht

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