Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Equity, Efficiency and Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining Games with Joint Production

  • Book
  • © 2000

Overview

Authors:
  1. Manfred Königstein

    1. Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie III, Humboldt-University at Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (LNE, volume 483)

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this book

Log in via an institution
eBook USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access

Licence this eBook for your library

Institutional subscriptions

Table of contents (6 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xii
    Download chapter PDF

  2. An Overview

    • Manfred Königstein
    Pages 1-4

  3. Profit Sharing in an Asymmetric Bargaining Game

    • Manfred Königstein
    Pages 5-32

  4. Measuring Treatment — Effects in Experimental Cross — Sectional Time Series

    • Manfred Königstein
    Pages 33-43

  5. Convergence to Equitable Play in the Repeated Ultimatum Game with Advance Production

    • Manfred Königstein
    Pages 45-65

  6. Equity Anchoring in Simple Bargaining Games with Production

    • Manfred Königstein
    Pages 67-89

  7. Efficiency and Evolution of Social Preferences and Prosocial Behavior

    • Manfred Königstein
    Pages 91-127

  8. Back Matter

    Pages 129-202
    Download chapter PDF
Back to top

Keywords

About this book

Result 1.10 Simple equity standards were superior to more complex ones, even though the latter might be economically more relevant. Result 1.11 Equity based on quantity (input) and return (output) was most successful and received a hit rate of almost i within a range of 10%, i.e., within a distance of ±5% of the predicted share. Result 1.12 A substantial share of observations is consistent with egalitarian considerations. 1.7 Summary The study investigates the predictive power of equity theory and strategic concepts within ultimatum bargaining with advance produc­ tion. This is different from many other experimental studies on non­ cooperative bargaining games, since usually the ressource to be dis­ tributed between the subjects is given by the experimenter. Here, the "pie" is produced via joint production effort. This scenario is more general than bargaining without production, and we think it is more natural as well. The description of the raw data showed that the production choices are considerably dispersed, but nevertheless systematically biased to­ ward the respective player's efficient production level. The distribu­ tions of demanded return shares and demanded surplus shares partly replicated findings of other studies; namely, a low percentage of high demands and a considerable proportion of equal surplus splits. But, they also indicate that "advance production" compared to "no pro­ duction" should be considered an important treatment in studies on ultimatum bargaining.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie III, Humboldt-University at Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Manfred Königstein

Bibliographic Information

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Back to top

Search

Navigation