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Decision Processes in Economics

Proceedings of the VI Italian Conference on Game Theory, Held in Modena, Italy, October 9–10, 1989

  • Conference proceedings
  • © 1991

Overview

Editors:
  1. Gianni Ricci

    1. Department of Political Economics, University of Modena, Modena, Italy

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (LNE, volume 353)

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Table of contents (15 papers)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-iii
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  2. Introduction

    • Gianni Ricci
    Pages 1-2

  3. A Continuous-Time Model of Monetary Policy and Inflation: A Stochastic Differential Game

    • Tamer Başar
    Pages 3-17

  4. Correlated Rationalizability Dominated Strategies, Refinements and Uniqueness

    • Mario Gilli
    Pages 18-27

  5. Bargaining on the Goodwin Model

    • Gianni Ricci
    Pages 28-33

  6. Cobwebs and something else

    • Ennio Cavazzuti
    Pages 34-43

  7. Learning and Persistence of Leadership in Product Innovation: Theory and Some Facts from the Semiconductor Industry

    • Harald Gruber
    Pages 44-56

  8. On Incomplete Information and the Emergence of Trade Unions

    • Pier Angelo Mori
    Pages 57-64

  9. Robust Lyapunov Games: The Continuous-Time Case

    • Christophe Deissenberg
    Pages 65-83

  10. Political and Financial Applications of the Power Indices

    • G. Gambarelli
    Pages 84-106

  11. Piecewise Deterministic and Piecewise Diffusion Differential Games with Modal Uncertainties

    • A. Haurie
    Pages 107-120

  12. Noncooperative Capacities of Simple Games

    • Stefano Vannucci
    Pages 121-139

  13. Algorithmic Solutions for Extensive Games

    • P. Battigalli
    Pages 140-169

  14. Communication Games

    • G. Pederzoli
    Pages 170-189

  15. Decomposition of Structured Linear Programs Based on Analytical Centers

    • J.-Ph. Vial
    Pages 190-203

  16. Bargaining and Optimal Investments

    • Antonietta Bassetti
    Pages 204-209

  17. Back Matter

    Pages 211-213
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Keywords

About this book

This book contains a selection of the papers presented at the symposium on "Decision processes in Economics" which was held in Modena (Italy) on 9-10 October 1989. It coincided with the annual meeting of the italian group on Game Theory; the group is formed by economists, mathematicians, engineers and social scientists. One of the targets of the Meeting, and therefore of the book, is to create an opportunity for having together papers by scientists with an "optimal control" education and papers by theorists on refinement of equilibrium, on repeted games and other topics. These two modes of working on Games are quite different but we think that a unitary approch to Games can be given and this book is an attempt in this direction. Another important and updated issue which is emphisized in the book is the discussion of computation and efficiency of numerical methods in Games. Stochastic differential games are treated in the papers by Basar, Haurie -and Deissemberg. Basar considers a stochastic model of a conflict situation between the monetary policy maker (go­ vernment) and the responding agent (private sector). Because of asymmetry in the (stochastic) information available the Nash and the Stackelberg games become non standard stochastic diffe­ rential games. After the discussion of the conditions leading to a solution he provides a numerical example for the proposed game. Haurie considers a game where the observed state changes according to a stochastic jump process.

Editors and Affiliations

  • Department of Political Economics, University of Modena, Modena, Italy

    Gianni Ricci

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