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Descriptive Theories of Bargaining

An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining

  • Book
  • © 1990

Overview

Authors:
  1. Gerald R. Uhlich

    1. Institut für Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Bonn, Bonn 1, Germany

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (LNE, volume 341)

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Table of contents (5 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-IX
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  2. Introduction

    • Gerald R. Uhlich
    Pages 1-3

  3. Notations and Definitions of Characteristic Function Games

    • Gerald R. Uhlich
    Pages 4-14

  4. Two-Person Bargaining Games

    • Gerald R. Uhlich
    Pages 15-42

  5. Three-Person Bargaining Games

    • Gerald R. Uhlich
    Pages 43-118

  6. Summary and Conclusion

    • Gerald R. Uhlich
    Pages 119-121

  7. Back Matter

    Pages 122-165
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Keywords

About this book

The aim of this book is the presentation of two new descriptive theories for experimental bargaining games and a comparison with other descriptive and normative theories. To obtain data it was necessary to develop two sets of computer programs for computer controlled ex­ periments. Moreover, data obtained by other researchers, which are available to us will be included in this study. The use of laboratory experiments in economics was introduced by THURSTONE [1931] in the field of utility theory. CHAMBERLIN [1948] was the first person to establish an expe­ rimental market for the purpose of testing a theory. The first experiment on characteristic function games was done by KALISH, MILNOR, NASH, and NERING [1954]. Today the use of experiments in controlled laboratory settings has become widespread. Earlier, economists went into the field to observe phenomena as the behavior of individuals, corporations and nations in action, then they formulated theories to explain what they saw. But unlike natural scientists, economists have not been able to test their theories under controlled conditions. Now experimental economists are able to replicate their results. Replication is very proble­ matic for field studies, because rarely the same conditions can be established again. Moreover, experimenters are able to test theories for situations described by simplified models which are not observable in the real world.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Institut für Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Bonn, Bonn 1, Germany

    Gerald R. Uhlich

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Descriptive Theories of Bargaining

  • Book Subtitle: An Experimental Analysis of Two- and Three-Person Characteristic Function Bargaining

  • Authors: Gerald R. Uhlich

  • Series Title: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45672-5

  • Publisher: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

  • Copyright Information: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1990

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-3-540-52483-0Published: 09 May 1990

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-642-45672-5Published: 06 December 2012

  • Series ISSN: 0075-8442

  • Series E-ISSN: 2196-9957

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: IX, 165

  • Topics: Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods

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