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Network Economics and the Allocation of Savings

A Model of Peering in the Voice-over-IP Telecommunications Market

  • Book
  • © 2012

Overview

  • First analysis of the VoIP Telecommunications Market Network-based framework of interconnection savings
  • Innovative n-player model of interconnection, including long distance and termination fees
  • Contains a concise over view of the methods of game theory and network theory
  • Contains a short overview of the liberalization of telecommunications markets in the 1980s and 1990s
  • Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (LNE, volume 653)

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Table of contents (8 chapters)

  1. Selected Theoretical Concepts

  2. Applications to Peering in Telecommunications

Keywords

About this book

This book provides a game theoretic model of interaction among VoIP telecommunications providers regarding their willingness to enter peering agreements with one another. The author shows that the incentive to peer is generally based on savings from otherwise payable long distance fees. At the same time, termination fees can have a countering and dominant effect, resulting in an environment in which VoIP firms decide against peering. Various scenarios of peering and rules for allocation of the savings are considered. The first part covers the relevant aspects of game theory and network theory, trying to give an overview of the concepts required in the subsequent application. The second part of the book introduces first a model of how the savings from peering can be calculated and then turns to the actual formation of peering relationships between VoIP firms. The conditions under which firms are willing to peer are then described, considering the possible influence of a regulatory body.

Authors and Affiliations

  • , Department Quantitative Economics, Université de Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland

    Philipp Servatius

About the author

Philipp Servatius took up employment in the private sector after being awarded his doctorate from the Department of Quantitative Economics at the University of Fribourg. He now works as analyst for a global reinsurer and lives in Zurich and Fribourg, Switzerland.

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