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Game Equilibrium Models II

Methods, Morals, and Markets

  • Book
  • © 1991

Overview

Editors:
  1. Reinhard Selten

    1. Institut für Gesellschaft- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftstheoretische Abteilung I, Universität Bonn, Bonn 1, Germany

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Table of contents (13 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-IX
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  2. Introduction to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”

    • Reinhard Selten
    Pages 1-2

  3. Introduction to Volume II: “Methods, Morals and Markets”

    • Ronald M. Harstad
    Pages 3-8

  4. The Algebraic Geometry of Games and the Tracing Procedure

    • Stephen H. Schanuel, Leo K. Simon, William R. Zame
    Pages 9-43

  5. A Perspective on Renegotiation in Repeated Games

    • Dilip Abreu, David Pearce
    Pages 44-55

  6. On Supergames and Folk Theorems: A Conceptual Discussion

    • Werner Güth, Wolfgang Leininger, Gunter Stephan
    Pages 56-70

  7. It’s Not What You Know, It’s Who You Play

    • Joel Sobel
    Pages 71-84

  8. Game Theory and the Social Contract

    • Ken Binmore
    Pages 85-163

  9. Anarchy and Agreement — A Game Theoretic Analysis of Some Aspects of Contractarianism

    • Akira Okada, Hartmut Kliemt
    Pages 164-187

  10. Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement Without Guards

    • Franz Weissing, Elinor Ostrom
    Pages 188-262

  11. Equilibrium Selection in the Spence Signaling Game

    • Eric van Damme, Werner Güth
    Pages 263-288

  12. Interaction between Resource Extraction and Futures Markets: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

    • Louis Phlips, Ronald M. Harstad
    Pages 289-307

  13. A Framing Effect Observed in a Market Game

    • Wulf Albers, Ronald M. Harstad
    Pages 308-336

  14. Rent Dissipation and Balanced Deviation Disequilibrium in Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence

    • James M. Walker, Roy Gardner, Elinor Ostrom
    Pages 337-367

  15. Back Matter

    Pages 369-370
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Keywords

Editors and Affiliations

  • Institut für Gesellschaft- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftstheoretische Abteilung I, Universität Bonn, Bonn 1, Germany

    Reinhard Selten

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