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Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications

First International ICST Conference, AMMA 2009, Boston, MA, USA, May 8-9, 2009, Revised Selected Papers

  • Conference proceedings
  • © 2009

Overview

Editors:
  1. Sanmay Das

    1. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, NY, USA

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  2. Michael Ostrovsky

    1. Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, USA

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  3. David Pennock

    1. Yahoo! Reseach, new York, NY, USA

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  4. Boleslaw Szymanksi

    1. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, NY, USA

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Conference proceedings info: AMMA 2009.

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Table of contents (16 papers)

  1. Front Matter

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  2. Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions

    • Stefan Schneider, Pasha Shabalin, Martin Bichler
    Pages 1-2

  3. Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence from Google

    • Bo Cowgill, Justin Wolfers, Eric Zitzewitz
    Pages 3-3

  4. A Copula Function Approach to Infer Correlation in Prediction Markets

    • Agostino Capponi, Umberto Cherubini
    Pages 4-12

  5. Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion

    • Ian A. Kash, Eric J. Friedman, Joseph Y. Halpern
    Pages 13-24

  6. A Centralized Auction Mechanism for the Disability and Survivors Insurance in Chile

    • Gonzalo Reyes H.
    Pages 25-25

  7. Information Feedback and Efficiency in Multiattribute Double Auctions

    • Kevin M. Lochner, Michael P. Wellman
    Pages 26-39

  8. Impact of Misalignment of Trading Agent Strategy across Multiple Markets

    • Jung-woo Sohn, Sooyeon Lee, Tracy Mullen
    Pages 40-54

  9. Market Design for a P2P Backup System

    • Sven Seuken, Denis Charles, Max Chickering, Sidd Puri
    Pages 55-57

  10. School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism

    • Antonio Miralles
    Pages 58-60

  11. Turing Trade: A Hybrid of a Turing Test and a Prediction Market

    • Joseph Farfel, Vincent Conitzer
    Pages 61-73

  12. A Market-Based Approach to Multi-factory Scheduling

    • Perukrishnen Vytelingum, Alex Rogers, Douglas K. Macbeth, Partha Dutta, Armin Stranjak, Nicholas R. Jennings
    Pages 74-86

  13. Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization

    • Maher Said
    Pages 87-88

  14. Revenue Submodularity

    • Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan
    Pages 89-91

  15. Fair Package Assignment

    • Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes
    Pages 92-92

  16. Solving Winner Determination Problems for Auctions with Economies of Scope and Scale

    • Martin Bichler, Stefan Schneider, Kemal Guler, Mehmet Sayal
    Pages 93-94

  17. Running Out of Numbers: Scarcity of IP Addresses and What to Do about It

    • Benjamin Edelman
    Pages 95-106

  18. Back Matter

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About this book

These proceedings present the technical contributions to the First Conference on A- tions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA), held May 8-9, 2009 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. The conference was devoted to issues that arise in all stages of deploying a market mechanism to solve a problem, including theoretical and empirical examinations. In addition to more traditional academic papers, the conf- ence placed emphasis on experiences from the real world, including case studies and new applications. The main goal of AMMA was to explore the synergy required for good mechanism design. This includes an understanding of the economic and game-theoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications. We were lucky enough to attract papers and talks from economists and computer scientists, theorists and empiricists, academics and practitioners. The program, as reflected in these proceedings, ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and m- kets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets.

Editors and Affiliations

  • Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, NY, USA

    Sanmay Das, Boleslaw Szymanksi

  • Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, USA

    Michael Ostrovsky

  • Yahoo! Reseach, new York, NY, USA

    David Pennock

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