Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '87

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-X

   PDF

2. Communication Networks and Standards

   1. Standards for Data Security — a Change of Direction

      • Wyn L. Price

      Pages 3-8

      PDF

   2. Integrating Cryptography in ISDN

      • Kåre Presttun

      Pages 9-18

      PDF

3. Protocols

   1. Special Uses and Abuses of the Fiat-Shamir Passport Protocol (extended abstract)

      • Yvo Desmedt, Claude Goutier, Samy Bengio

      Pages 21-39

      PDF

   2. Direct Minimum-Knowledge Computations (Extended Abstract)

      • Russell Impagliazzo, Moti Yung

      Pages 40-51

      PDF

   3. Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems

      • Alfredo De Santis, Silvio Micali, Giuseppe Persiano

      Pages 52-72

      PDF

   4. How to Solve any Protocol Problem - An Efficiency Improvement (Extended Abstract)

      • Oded Goldrcich, Ronen Vainish

      Pages 73-86

      PDF

   5. Multiparty Computations Ensuring Privacy of Each Party’s Input and Correctness of the Result

      • David Chaum, Ivan B. Damgård, Jeroen van de Graaf

      Pages 87-119

      PDF

   6. Society and Group Oriented Cryptography: a New Concept

      • Yvo Desmedt

      Pages 120-127

      PDF

   7. A Simple and Secure Way to Show the Validity of Your Public Key

      • Jeroen van de Graaf, Renė Peralta

      Pages 128-134

      PDF

   8. Cryptographic Computation: Secure Fault-Tolerant Protocols and the Public-Key Model (Extended Abstract)

      • Zvi Galil, Stuart Haber, Moti Yung

      Pages 135-155

      PDF

   9. Gradual and Verifiable Release of a Secret (Extended Abstract)

      • Ernest F. Brickell, David Chaum, Ivan B. Damgård, Jeroen van de Graaf

      Pages 156-166

      PDF

   10. Strong Practical Protocols

       • Judy H. Moore

       Pages 167-172

       PDF

4. Key Distribution Systems

   1. Identity-based conference key distribution systems

      • Kenji Koyama, Kazuo Ohta

      Pages 175-184

      PDF

   2. On the KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SYSTEM: A Practical Solution to the Key Distribution Problem

      • Tsutomu Matsumoto, Hideki Imai

      Pages 185-193

      PDF

   3. Key Distribution Systems Based on Identification Information

      • Eiji Okamoto

      Pages 194-202

      PDF

   4. Secret Distribution of Keys for Public-Key Systems

      • Jean-Jacques Quisquater

      Pages 203-208

      PDF

5. Public Key Systems

   1. An Impersonation-Proof Identity Verification Scheme

      • Gustavus J. Simmons

      Pages 211-215

      PDF

   2. Arbitration in Tamper Proof Systems

      • George I. Davida, Brian J. Matt

      Pages 216-222

      PDF

   3. Efficient Digital Public-Key Signatures with Shadow

      • Louis Guillou, Jean-Jacques Quisquater

      Pages 223-223

      PDF

Zero-knowledge interactive proofsystems are a new technique which can be used as a cryptographic tool for designing provably secure protocols. Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff originally suggested this technique for controlling the knowledge released in an interactive proof of membership in a language, and for classification of languages [19]. In this approach, knowledge is defined in terms of complexity to convey knowledge if it gives a computational advantage to the receiver, theory, and a message is said for example by giving him the result of an intractable computation. The formal model of interacting machines is described in [19, 15, 171. A proof-system (for a language L) is an interactive protocol by which one user, the prover, attempts to convince another user, the verifier, that a given input x is in L. We assume that the verifier is a probabilistic machine which is limited to expected polynomial-time computation, while the prover is an unlimited probabilistic machine. (In cryptographic applications the prover has some trapdoor information, or knows the cleartext of a publicly known ciphertext) A correct proof-system must have the following properties: If XE L, the prover will convince the verifier to accept the pmf with very high probability. If XP L no prover, no matter what program it follows, is able to convince the verifier to accept the proof, except with vanishingly small probability.

• authentication
• cryptoanalysis
• cryptography
• cryptology
• cryptosystems
• data security
• digital signature
• encryption
• privacy
• security

• Department of Mathematics, The University of Georgia, Athens, USA

  Carl Pomerance

Policies and ethics