Differential Information Economies

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-XIII

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2. Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies

   • Dionysius Glycopantis, Nicholas C. Yannelis

   Pages 1-53

3. Core Notions, Existence Results

   1. Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy

      • Robert Wilson

      Pages 55-64

   2. Information, efficiency and the core of an economy: Comments on Wilson’s paper

      • Dionysius Glycopantis, Nicholas C. Yannelis

      Pages 65-71

   3. The core of an economy with differential information

      • Nicholas C. Yannelis

      Pages 73-86

   4. An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private core

      • Isabelle Lefebvre

      Pages 87-103

   5. On the continuity of expected utility

      • Erik J. Balder, Nicholas C. Yannelis

      Pages 105-124

   6. Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core

      • Frank H. Page Jr.

      Pages 125-134

   7. A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economiesw

      • Leonidas C. Koutsougeras

      Pages 135-156

   8. Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information

      • Stefan Maus

      Pages 157-171

4. Core and Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium Equivalence

   1. Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information

      • Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz

      Pages 173-183

   2. Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies

      • Françoise Forges, Aviad Heifetz, Enrico Minelli

      Pages 185-201

   3. Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core

      • Stefan Maus

      Pages 203-226

5. Core, Pareto Optimality and Incentive Compatibility

   1. Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information

      • Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, Nicholas C. Yannelis

      Pages 227-248

   2. Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies

      • Guangsug Hahn, Nicholas C. Yannelis

      Pages 249-277

   3. Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core

      • Beth Allen

      Pages 279-296

   4. Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm

      • Tatsuro Ichiishi, Murat R. Sertel

      Pages 297-317

   5. Optimal multilateral contracts

      • Stefan Krasa, Anne P. Villamil

      Pages 319-340

   6. Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry

      • Martin F. Hellwig

      Pages 341-363

   7. Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans

      • Jülide Yazar

      Pages 365-376

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined. 

• Differential Information Economies
• Equilibrium Theory
• bargaining
• cooperative games
• economic theory
• economics
• efficiency
• equilibrium
• incomplete information
• information theory
• mathematical economics

• Department of Economics, City University, London, Great Britain

  Dionysius Glycopantis

• Department of Economics, University of Illinois, Champaign, USA

  Nicholas C. Yannelis

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