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Differential Information Economies

  • Book
  • © 2005

Overview

Editors:
  1. Dionysius Glycopantis

    1. Department of Economics, City University, London, Great Britain

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  2. Nicholas C. Yannelis

    1. Department of Economics, University of Illinois, Champaign, USA

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  • Gives an overview of differential information economies
  • Explores all aspects of the field

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Theory (ECON.THEORY, volume 19)

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Table of contents (32 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-XIII
    Download chapter PDF

  2. Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies

    • Dionysius Glycopantis, Nicholas C. Yannelis
    Pages 1-53

  3. Core Notions, Existence Results

    1. Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy

      • Robert Wilson
      Pages 55-64

    2. Information, efficiency and the core of an economy: Comments on Wilson’s paper

      • Dionysius Glycopantis, Nicholas C. Yannelis
      Pages 65-71

    3. The core of an economy with differential information

      • Nicholas C. Yannelis
      Pages 73-86

    4. An alternative proof of the nonemptiness of the private core

      • Isabelle Lefebvre
      Pages 87-103

    5. On the continuity of expected utility

      • Erik J. Balder, Nicholas C. Yannelis
      Pages 105-124

    6. Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core

      • Frank H. Page Jr.
      Pages 125-134

    7. A two-stage core with applications to asset market and differential information economiesw

      • Leonidas C. Koutsougeras
      Pages 135-156

    8. Balancedness and the core in economies with asymmetric information

      • Stefan Maus
      Pages 157-171

  4. Core and Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium Equivalence

    1. Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information

      • Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz
      Pages 173-183

    2. Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies

      • Françoise Forges, Aviad Heifetz, Enrico Minelli
      Pages 185-201

    3. Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive equilibrium and core

      • Stefan Maus
      Pages 203-226

  5. Core, Pareto Optimality and Incentive Compatibility

    1. Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information

      • Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, Nicholas C. Yannelis
      Pages 227-248

    2. Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies

      • Guangsug Hahn, Nicholas C. Yannelis
      Pages 249-277

    3. Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: the core

      • Beth Allen
      Pages 279-296

    4. Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler’s M-form firm

      • Tatsuro Ichiishi, Murat R. Sertel
      Pages 297-317

    5. Optimal multilateral contracts

      • Stefan Krasa, Anne P. Villamil
      Pages 319-340

    6. Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry

      • Martin F. Hellwig
      Pages 341-363

    7. Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans

      • Jülide Yazar
      Pages 365-376
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Keywords

About this book

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined. 

Editors and Affiliations

  • Department of Economics, City University, London, Great Britain

    Dionysius Glycopantis

  • Department of Economics, University of Illinois, Champaign, USA

    Nicholas C. Yannelis

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