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Global Differences in Corporate Governance Systems

Theory and Implications for Reforms

  • Book
  • © 2002

Overview

Authors:
  1. Markus Berndt
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Part of the book series: Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts (ÖAR)

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Table of contents (10 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-XVIII
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  2. Introduction

    • Markus Berndt
    Pages 1-3

  3. Differences in Corporate Governance Systems

    • Markus Berndt
    Pages 4-21

  4. Analytical Framework

    • Markus Berndt
    Pages 22-31

  5. Dispersed Control - the Outsider System

    • Markus Berndt
    Pages 32-43

  6. Concentrated Control - the Insider System

    • Markus Berndt
    Pages 44-67

  7. Network Effects via Capital Markets

    • Markus Berndt
    Pages 68-75

  8. Evolutionary Model

    • Markus Berndt
    Pages 76-92

  9. Implications for Corporate Governance Reforms

    • Markus Berndt
    Pages 93-105

  10. The Influence of Coordination Benefits on Corporate Governance and Accounting Standards

    • Markus Berndt
    Pages 106-126

  11. Conclusion

    • Markus Berndt
    Pages 127-135

  12. Back Matter

    Pages 137-145
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Keywords

About this book

Over the past few decades two different corporate governance systems have evolved. Countries with an "insider system" exhibit a high level of ownership concentration, illiquid capital markets, and a high level of crossholdings. Countries with an "outsider system" are characterized by widely dispersed ownership, liquid stock markets, a low level of inter-corporate crossholdings, and an active market for corporate control.

Markus Berndt explains the observable differences by elaborating on the influence of network effects on corporate governance systems. He develops a coherent theoretical framework pulling together existing agency theories and providing new theoretical foundations wherever there is a gap. The presented theory gives answers to the following questions: How does the insider system of corporate governance function despite its inefficiencies? Why do we not see any significant convergence of ownership structures and regulations? What are the legislative requirements in the different systems? How does globalization affect the effectiveness of the institutional arrangements? Which system should be chosen by developing countries?

About the author

Dr. Markus Berndt promovierte bei Prof. Dr. Manfred J. Holler im Rahmen des Graduiertenkollegs für "Recht und Ökonomik" der Universität Hamburg. Er ist Referent am Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung in Bonn.

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