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Why Paramilitary Operations Fail

  • Book
  • © 2018

Overview

Authors:
  1. Armin Krishnan

    1. Department of Political Science, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, USA

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  • Provides a systematic analysis of all known CIA PMOs and explains the why, who, and how of proxy warfare

  • Includes both a survey of secondary literature and an array of primary sources

  • Adds a theoretical perspective with the application of principal agent theory to the field of covert action and proxy warfare

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Table of contents (10 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xvii
    Download chapter PDF

  2. What Are Paramilitary Operations?

    • Armin Krishnan
    Pages 1-20

  3. A Short History of US Paramilitary Operations

    • Armin Krishnan
    Pages 21-54

  4. Conducting Paramilitary Operations

    • Armin Krishnan
    Pages 55-84

  5. Dilemmas of Secrecy

    • Armin Krishnan
    Pages 85-105

  6. Accountability in Paramilitary Operations

    • Armin Krishnan
    Pages 107-132

  7. Critical Loss of Control

    • Armin Krishnan
    Pages 133-155

  8. War Crimes and Criminal Conduct

    • Armin Krishnan
    Pages 157-177

  9. Endgames and Outcomes

    • Armin Krishnan
    Pages 179-203

  10. The Disposal Problem

    • Armin Krishnan
    Pages 205-228

  11. New Developments

    • Armin Krishnan
    Pages 229-248

  12. Back Matter

    Pages 249-254
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Keywords

About this book

This book analyzes U.S. pro-insurgency paramilitary operations (PMOs) or U.S. proxy warfare from the beginning of the Cold War to the present and explains why many of these operations either failed entirely to achieve their objective, or why they produced negative consequences that greatly diminished their benefits. The chapters cover important aspects of what PMOs are, the history of U.S. PMOs, how they function, the dilemmas of secrecy and accountability, the issues of control, criminal conduct, and disposal of proxies, as well as newer developments that may change PMOs in the future. The author argues that the general approach of conducting PMOs as covert operations is inherently flawed since it tends to undermine many possibilities for control over proxies in a situation where the interests of sponsors and proxies necessarily diverge on key issues.  

Reviews

“Covert action emerged in the spirit of JFK’s inaugural can-doism, the most magical snake oil ever handed to the US national security establishment. As Armin Krishnan shows, some sixty years later covert paramilitary action remains a potent narcotic. Krishnan’s book is the clearest and most convincing explanation of the limits of covert paramilitary operations, an engaging read and an essential bit of modesty for anyone still tempted by national security can-doism.” (Aaron Karp, Senior Lecturer, Old Dominion University, USA)

“Recent U.S. involvement in the Syrian ‘civil war’ backing anti-Assad rebels exists along a dismal continuum of U.S. supported paramilitary operations (PMOs). This timely work provides a critical analysis of 25 PMOs—in essence, U.S. proxy warfare meant to destabilize hostile regimes—undertaken between 1949 and the present. Major policy findings of this important study, which should hold great interest to both elected and non-elected governmental decision makers, are that autonomous armed groups are uncontrollable and their use should be avoided, thus contracted mercenaries should instead be utilized in a more specific and limited role in these operations.” (Robert J. Bunker, Past Minerva Chair, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, USA)        

Authors and Affiliations

  • Department of Political Science, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, USA

    Armin Krishnan

About the author

Armin Krishnan is Assistant Professor and Director of the Security Studies Program at East Carolina University, USA.



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