Authors:
Presents a timely defense of a non-reificatory notion of belief
Argues that the attachment of the behaviourist label to Ryle and Wittgenstein is unjustified
Explains how the non-reificatory approach was born out of the ordinary language philosophy of the twentieth century
Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras
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Table of contents (7 chapters)
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Front Matter
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Back Matter
About this book
This book argues against the mainstream view that we should treat propositional attitudes as internal states, suggesting that to treat beliefs as things of certain sort (i.e. to reify them) is a mistake. The reificatory view faces several problems that the non-reificatory view avoids, and it is argued the non-reificatory view is more faithful to the everyday concept of belief. There are several major reasons why it might be thought that a reificatory approach to mental states is nevertheless unavoidable, but this book attempts to show that none of these reasons is at all convincing; in each case, the evidence is consistent with a non-reificatory view. Having argued that the popularity of the reificatory view is unjustified, the author examines history of psychology and philosophy of mind, and the structure of psychological language, in order to show that this popularity is quite understandable, but mistaken nonetheless.
Authors and Affiliations
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University of Lancaster, Lancaster, United Kingdom
Richard Floyd
About the author
Richard Floyd received his PhD from Lancaster University, UK. He has taught philosophy at the Universities of Lancaster, Manchester, and Cumbria. This is his first book.
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: The Non-Reificatory Approach to Belief
Authors: Richard Floyd
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59873-4
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan Cham
eBook Packages: Religion and Philosophy, Philosophy and Religion (R0)
Copyright Information: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-319-59872-7Published: 28 July 2017
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-319-86723-6Published: 12 May 2018
eBook ISBN: 978-3-319-59873-4Published: 19 July 2017
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: IX, 212
Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language, History of Psychology