Skip to main content

Mind in Action

Experience and Embodied Cognition in Pragmatism

  • Book
  • © 2015

Overview

  • Examines the consequences of re-evaluating the dichotomies of apparent and real, and that of the internal and external
  • Discusses the notion of habit of action as vehicle of knowing
  • Gives an analysis of mind as a property of organism environment interaction
  • Shows the connection between facts and values in naturalism
  • Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics (SAPERE, volume 18)

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this book

eBook USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access

Licence this eBook for your library

Institutional subscriptions

Table of contents (7 chapters)

Keywords

About this book

The book questions two key dichotomies: that of the apparent and real, and that of the internal and external. This leads to revised notions of the structure of experience and the object of knowledge. Our world is experienced as possibilities of action, and to know is to know what to do. A further consequence is that the mind is best considered as a property of organisms’ interactions with their environment. The unit of analysis is the loop of action and perception, and the central concept is the notion of habit of action, which provides the embodied basis of cognition as the anticipation of action. This holds for non-linguistic tacit meanings as well as for linguistic meanings. Habit of action is a teleological notion and thus opens a possibility for defining intentionality and normativity in terms of the soft naturalism adopted in the book. The mind is embodied, and this embodiment determines our physical perspective on the world. Our sensory organs and other instruments give us instrumental access to the world, and this access is epistemic in character. The distinction between the physical and conceptual viewpoint allows us to define truth as the correspondence with operational fit. This embodied epistemic truth is however not a sign of antirealism, as the instrumentally accessed theoretical objects are precisely those objects that experimental science deals with.

 

Authors and Affiliations

  • Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

    Pentti Määttänen

Bibliographic Information

Publish with us